ARMS CONTROL IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC

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Introduction

Over the past five years there has been a considerable upsurge of interest in regional arms control in the Asia-Pacific - although few concrete measures have been implemented and the idea remains controversial.

Regional interest in arms control has been directed towards confidence-building measures (CBMs) rather than force level reductions. which, given asymmetries in force structures and alliance relationships tend to be seen as too difficult to implement. In fact arms budgets are increasingly rapidly within the region while those in Europe, the US and USSR fall.

But although the term 'confidence-building' has entered the mainstream security discourse in the region, there remains a considerable amount of confusion about what confidence-building actually means - not least at the official level. In Europe, the concept of 'confidence-building measure' emerged from more than twenty years of official discussions at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). There has been no comparable regional dialogue on security in the Asia-Pacific. Here, officials tend to be increasingly familiar with particular CBMs - advanced notification of exercises say, but have little knowledge of the security philosophy from which these measures emerged in Europe. Even in the writings of security analysts

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working on these issues it is sometimes unclear whose 'confidence CBMs are supposed to build, and there is almost no discussion on the psychological mechanisms via which 'confidence' will supposedly be built. Lack of definitioanl consensus also surrounds many of the other ideas which form part of the emerging security discourse - 'security cooperation', 'security community', 'common security', 'cooperative security' and so forth.

The purpose of CSBMs

'Confidence-building' is a process, '... designed to enhance assurance of mind and belief in the trustworthiness of states.'[1] Clearly reductions in force levels may have this effect, but the term 'confidence-building measure' (CBM) usually refers to measures other than force level reductions. Today the term 'confidence-and security-building measure' (CSBM) tends to be preferred to 'CBM'. Some analysts prefer the term 'tension-reduction measure' (TRM).

Arms control advocates tend to see CSBMs in terms of their role in improving relations between states; military planners tend to be more interested in the military utility of CSBMs. The late Jonathan Alford of the International Institute for Strategic Studies once described CSBMs as 'measures which make military intentions obvious'.[2] Clearly there is no necessary incompatibility between these two conceptions.

CSBMs may be grouped into a number of different categories :

1. Political CSBMs

So-called 'political' CSBMs are usually either declarations of peaceful intent or non-aggression agreements. Examples in he Asia-Pacific region include the agreement between China and Burma in 1960, the Treaty of Peace and Friendship signed be-

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1) J.J. Holst, "Confidence-Building Measures-a Conceptual Framework", *Survival* (January/February 1983) p.2.

2) Jonathan Alford, 'The Usefulness and Limitations of CBMs', in W. Epstein and B. T.Feld (eds), *New Directions in Disarmament* (Praeger, New York, 1981) p.134.

tween Japan and China in 1978, and the Bali Declaration of Amity and Concord of 1976. Nuclear No First Use pledges may also be seen as political CSBMs.

2. Transparency CSBMs

While 'political' CSBMs require trust, so-called 'transparency' CSBMs, which seek to minimize security dilemma risks, do not. 'Transparency' CSBMs aim to maximize exchanges of information over a wide range of security issues - from data on military budgets, to advance notification of military exercises. The utility of 'transparency' measures is not dependent on trust between the parties involved, but on the verifiable provision of specific military - related information. Access to reliable information about potential adversaries is a necessary, but not sufficient condition, for building mutual confidence. In the absence of such information intelligence assessments tend to be biassed towards 'worst case' thinking. Such assessments tend to promote arms races—as was dramatically evident in the 'bomber gap' scare in the US in the 1950s.

Transparency CSBMs are intended primarily to reduce misunder-standings, fear and suspicion and the risk of inadvertent war. CSBM are directed towards reassuring potential opponents. But CSBMs proponents recognise that aggression is always a possibility and 'transparency' CSBMs have the further virtue of functioning as 'early warning' systems against aggression. Such CSBMs are a form of military intelligence as well as a means of enhancing confidence. For regional states which lack the sort of sophisticated surveillance capabilities possessed by the superpowers such 'transparency' CSBMs may be particularly valuable.

'Constraint CSBMs'[3] seek to ban, limit, or otherwise control military operations and deployments which are seen as potentially destabilising. Such measures include the creation of de-militarized zones; anti-submarine warfare-free zones; nuclear-free zones etc. The physical separation of forces which most such zone proposals require is intended to increase warning time, make surprise attack more difficult and prevent

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3) Sometimes called 'regulatory' CSBMs. The term 'operational arms control' is sometimes used to describe the effect of information and restraint/regulatory CSBMs.

minor clashes (such as those which have taken place on the inter-korean border) which could escalate into major confrontations. Other restraint measures include proscriptions on mock attacks and similar provocative manoeuvres. Perhaps the best known and most successful 'constraint' CSBM is the 1972 US/Soviet Incidents as Sea (INCSEA) agreement.

With the exception of various proposals for a genuinely demilitarised DMZ for the inter - Korean border, there have been few 'constraint' CSBMs proposed specifically for the region - although the Soviets and Chinese have successfully negotiated disengagement zones for their forces along the Sino-Soviet border. All Soviet 'bconstraint' CSBM proposals - most of them for various types of naval disengagement zones-have been rejected by the US. (See appendix for complete list of Soviet proposals which affect the Pacific theatre.) 4. Defence-Dominant Force Structures and Strategies

The most far-reaching confidence-building regime would require states to adopt defensively-oriented force structures and strategies.

A state with truly defensive force posture would be incapable of invading and occupying other states, but should still be capable of mounting an effective defence against aggression. Such measures - which have been proposed by the south Korean government in its arms control talks with the North - are beyond the scope of this paper.

Japan's rejection of power projection forces has enabled the JSDF to embark on a long period of military building - up without generating the degree of regional concern that might otherwise have been expected. Japan has no long - range bombers, no aircraft carriers, no real amphibious capability, or powerful marine - type forces. The defensive orientation of Japen's force structure has clearly been an important regional confidence - building measure.

Extant CSBM Regimes in the Pacific

Although not generally conceived as such there are, as Trevor Findlay has pointed out, already a considerable number of CSBM regimes in place in the Asia-Pacific region. They include a series of agreements negotiated between the US and the USSR

- including the 1972 Incidents at sea Agreement; the 1989 Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities Regime; the 1989 Agreement on Innocent Passage in the Territorial Sea; the 1989 Agreement on Advance on Notification of Ballistic Missile Tests. These, however, are global agreements which apply to the pacific, as elsewhere, rather than regional agreements per se.

Findlay notes that there are also :

…some agreements specfic to the Asia-Pacific region which contain some CSBM elements, albeit not strictly of the type associted with the European CSCE model : [4]

The region-specific CSBMs include those embodied in :
* the 1990 and 1991 Sino-Soviet border agreements
* the 1989 US/Soviet Bering Straits Region Commission
* the 1988 Regional Air Safety Agreement between the US, Japan and the Soviet Union
* the 1985 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty
* the Zone of Cooperation in the Timor Sea which was the product of the Timor Gap Treaty signed between Australia and New Zealand which entered into force in early 1991
* ASEAN's 1971 Zone of Peace Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) and the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Concord of 1976.

A number of 'classic' CSCE-type CSBMs have been proposed by both sides in the Korean confrontation. These include advanced notification of exercises, 'hotlines' between military commands, and a proper military disengagement zone for the DMZ. A 'hotline' run by the red Cross already links North and South Korea.

In addition, regional involvement in other multiateral non-security regimes such as APEC, the South Pacific Forum and ASEAN, may help foster the habit of cooperation

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4) Trevor Findlay, 'Characteristics of CSBMs in Asia and the Pacific'. Paper presented to UN Workshop on CSEMs for the Asia-Pacific region in Kathmandu, January 1991. p.2.

which, in itself, will have a positive security spin-off. Indeed some analysts have argued that APEC could be a possible vehicle for discussions on regional security. Such a role has already proposed for ASEAN. At the July 1990. ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM), Philippines Secretary of State, Raul Manglapus, proposed that in future ASEAN should discuss the security problems of South-East Asia. The AMM agreed and in June this year the foreign ministries of the Philippines and Thailand sponsored a major international conference in Manila which had as its theme, 'ASEAN and the Asia-Pacific Region : Prospects for Security Cooperation in the 1990s' A follow-on conference will be held later in thr year in Thailand.

Governmental Attitudes to CSBM Initiatives

This section reviews the stance of the two superpowers and Australia and Canada towards regional confidence-bulilding. In the past two years the latter two nations have advanced CSBM proposals for the region which have attracted considerable interest and not a little controversy.

The USSR

In July 1986 Mr Gorbachev gave a much-publicised speech in which he called for the creation of a 'Pacific conference along the lines of the Helsinki conference'[5] and proposed that talks be commenced with the US on restricting certain naval activities. In making this speech Gorbachev reiterated a number of consistent thems in Soviet security which related to the threat which Moscow sees the UN Navy as posing to the USSR. In subsequent speeches - particularly one in Krasnoyarsk in September 1988 - Mr Gorbachev and other Soviet officials have stressed the need for restraints to be negotiated on naval activities.the broad intent of Soviet naval CSBM proposals is to keep the US Navy as far away from Soviet territory as possible. Soviet proposals actually call for mutual restraint - neither side should approach too close to the territory of the other. But Soviet 'constraint' CSBMs,which appear symmetrical in that

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5) Text of speech by Mikhail Gorbachev, Vladivostok, July 28 1986. p.223.

they apply equally to both sides, would in fact be asymmetrical in their effect. The US Navy is forward deployed as part of its treaty relationships with allies and has a forward - offensive strategy. The Soviet Navy, by contrast, has no allies close to the US to protect and has a broadly defensive, rather than offensive, naval strategy, so the type of constraint regime the Soviets have in mind would be of benefit primarily to them - that at least is the US view. Soviet 'constraint' CSBM proposals which apply to the pacific include :

1. proscriptions on naval vessels approaching to within certain distances of an opponent's coast

2. anti-submarine warfare zones (usually intended to protect SSBN sanctuaires)

3. maritime nuclear weapon-free zones

4. limits on naval operations near international shipping lanes and international straits

The Soviets argue that it makes little sense to exclude naval forces from arms control/CSBM negotiations. They point out that weapons platforms on naval vessels (e.g. US carrier-borne strike aircraft, Tomahawk cruise missiles) can play an important role in land battles, while land-based weapons systems (e.g. SNA Backfires) can be used to strike at naval forces.[6]

The Soviets also note that they have responded to US concerns about the superior, offensive and destabilising Soviet land forces that were deployed along the Central Front in Europe by instituting asymmetric reductions and 'defensive restructuring' of their forces. Equity demands that the US respond to their concerns about the superior, offensive and destabilising US naval forces which are forward-deployed against the USSR in the North Pacific and elsewhere.[7]

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6) For an interesting recent statement of the Soviet position on naval arms control see Andrew E. Granovskiy, 'Confidence-Building Measures in the Maritime Environment', *Disarmament* (No.1, 1991). Granovskiy is a Foreign Ministry official who specialises in naval arms control.

7) US officials privately dismiss the 'equity' arguments by noting that the economic crisis at home meant that the Soviets had no choice but to make massive defence cuts. The US is not under similar economic pressure and can therefore ignore the self-serving 'equity' argument.

Soviet officials respond to criticisms that their 'constraint' CSBM proposals would impact more on US naval forces than Soviet naval forces, by arguing that this is perfectly reasonable since it is the US which is in the superior position. They note that the CFE agreement impacted far more on Soviet forces than those of NATO.

Some Soviet officials recognise that their far-reaching 'constraint' CSBM proposals have no chance of being accepted at the moment and have indeed been counter-productive. These officials now argue that a start should be made with the 'simplest of confidence-building measures'.[8]

Moscow's stance on Asia-Pacific security issues is still evolving and some of the more recent changes in the Soviet position are highly significant. In a paper delivered to the June 1991 ASEAN security conference in Manila, Ambassador Vladimir Fedotov stated that the USSR now sees that the 'military presence of the United States in Asia and the Pacific plays a certain stabilising role'.

Soviet officials have also called for cooperation between the US and Soviet navies in dealing with such 'non-traditional threats' as :

> ···drug trafficking, terrorism, environmental disasters and threats to the uninterrupted operation of international sea lanes.[9]

While the Soviet position continues to evolve and now appears to contain elements which the West should welcome, a number of more general concerns remain. First, Moscow tends to advance its proposals in the public arena without prior consultation with the US or its allies. This naturally fuels suspicion in the West that the proposals are being made as much for propaganda reasons as anything else. Second, while a number of broad security concerns clearly underpin most soviet proposals, the tthemselves appear to be made in an ad hoc and inconsistent manner. As James Lacy points out, the Soviet CSBM menu :

> ... manages to cover nearly everything ... in several regions of the world, to be discussed in any number of possible forums; with or without direct linkage to existing talks in Vienna or Geneva, on most counts without very much detail at present, and with

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8) Granovskiy, 'Confidence-Building Measures in the Maritime Environment'. p.159.
9) *Ibid.* p.162.

no prioritization among the many themes and parts.[10]

As long as this pattern persists the Soviets will continue to provide ammunition for those in the US who are opposed any movement on the CSBM front.

The United States

In sharp contrast to its security policy in Europe, the US has not made any arms control initiatives for the Asia-Pacific region[11]-indeed it has devoted considerable energy to opposing those that have been made-not only soviet initiatives, but those of Australia and Canada as well. I have critically reviewed the US stance on regional arms control for the Asia-Pacific elsewhere and will not repeat those arguments at length here.[12] Noted below are simply a number of the major US arguments against regional arms control for the Pacific - and some brief responses to them.

1. 'Informal regional arms control makes negotiation unnecessary.'

    According to Assistant Secretary of State, Richard Solomon, the region has witnessed the emergence of 'an informal arms control process, sometimes unilateral, sometimes reciprocal in character.'[13] This has led to mutual troop reductions along the Sino-Soviet border, Soviet withdrawals from Vietnam and Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia. US and Soviet defence expenditure, are down, as is the rate of growth of Japanese defence expenditure. The most re- cent and dramatic case has been the Bush statement announcing the withdrawal of land-based tactical nuclear weapons 'worldwide' -which inclear weapons from

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10) James L. Lacy, 'The Baroque Debate : Public Diplomacy and Naval Arms Control, 1986~1989 (Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, August 1990). p.32.

11) The US gives cautious suport to the negotiation of CSBMs on the Korean peninsula, howeve.

12) See Andrew Mack, 'Arms Control at Sea', paper presented to a conference on 'Naval Power in the Pacific', Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, May 13~14, 1991 and······

13) Richard H. Solomon, 'Asian Security in the 1990s : Integration in Economics; Diversity in Security', address to Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California, San Diego. p.11.

US surface ships and submarines.

The implication of Secretary's Solomon's statement is that negotiated agreements are unnecessary.

The problem with this argument is that non-negotiated force level reductions and informal CSBMs are hostage to good fortune. They are an artifact of improved political relationships and could easily be reversed if political relationships deteriorate. If relationships do worsen and verifiable arms control/ CSBM agreements are in place, they may help prevent the emergence of destabilising regional arms races and help moderate the tendency for tension and suspicion to rise.

2. 'Resolving the major political conflicts in the region - e.g. Cambodia, or the dispute between the USSR and Japan over the so-called 'Northern Territories' - should take precedence over the negotiation of CSBM regimes.

   This argument poses a false dichotomy and has little logic to support it. Conflict resolution and CSBMs are not incompatible - quite the contrary. The institution of CSBM regimes may help ameliorate political relationships and thus facilitate the resolution of the conflicts in Question. The US recognises that this is the case on the Korean peninsula - it is equally true elsewhere.

3. 'Naval CSBMs impinge on the internationally accepted doctrine of the freedom of the seas.'

   All maritime regulations - the Rules of the Road, INCSEA, separation lanes, etc. - impinge on the freedom to use the seas in a completely unrestrained way. The particular afreedoms' that these agreements curtail are risk-prone, which is why states have agreed legislate them away.

4. 'Advanced notification of exercises will prevent US naval forces exercising coercive diplomacy in a crisis under the guise of conducting exercises.'

   This is true, but it is not clear that much would be lost. Coercive diplomacy is often far less efficacious than its proponents believe. Anyway it could still be practised if advanced notification of exercises were introduced - albeit without the ambiguity.

5. 'Even the most modest 'transparency' CSBMs should be rejected since, though

unobjectionable in themselves, they may lead to a 'slippery slope' which could draw the US into more far-reaching 'constraint' CSBMs.'

The 'slippery slope' argument is unpersuasive. It presupposes that US negotiators will find it difficult or impossibe to counter proposals which are against Administration policy - a supposition which is supported neither by serious argument, nor by the history of arms control negotiations. If the 'slippery slope' argument had any real validity the US would never enter any arms control negotiations. Finally, the radical Bush statment on tactical naval nuclear weapons has rendered 'slippery slop' concerns largely meaningless.

6. 'The asymmetry in force and alliance structures between the superpowers means that the negotiation of CSBM regimes will be much more difficult in Asia than it was in Europe.'

This may true, but it does not follow that such negotiations are either impossible or undesirable. It should aiso be noted that many of the difficulties which apply to negotiating force level reductions - for which there is no general support in the region - do not apply to CSBM regimes. The US has tended to make an exception for the Korean peninsula when articulating this argument.

7. 'The asymmetry of geopolitical interests between the superpowers makes naval arms control undesirable for the US.'

This is a serious argument. As Richard Solomon has noted :

···the Soviet Union is a great Eurasian land power, the US is a maritime power. The sealanes are to US security what roads and railways are to the Soviets.[14]

To protect their vital sea-lines of communication (SLOCs) sea-dependent trading nations, like the US, need to deploy more powerful naval forces than states which are less sea-dependent, like the Soviet Union.[15] With regard to SLOC protection it follows that negotiations on naval force levels which seek to achieve the traditional arms control goal of parity in numbers and/or capability would necessaily

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14) Solomon, 'Asian Security in the 1990s', p.13.
15) *Ibid.* p.2.

disadvantage the more sea-dependent nation.[16]

The argument that parity-oriented force level reductions would disadvantage the more sea-dependent states in negotiations is persuasive. But in making it the US is pushing at an open door. Soviet naval arms control proposals have focused overwhelming on constraining what Moscow perceives to be threatening and destabilising US naval operations - not on force level reductions. The Soviet naval arms control agenda in other words, is dominated more by a concern for 'op er ational' (CSBM-oriented) rather than 'structural' (i.e. force level) naval arms control. If the US is as concerned about SLOC protection as it claims, it is surprising that Soviet proposals for US/Soviet cooperative protection of SLOCs should have generated so little interest in Washington.

8. 'Constraint CSBMs undermine deterrence and thus increase the risks of war.'

This argument is at the root of navy objections to naval arms control. The US argues that Soviet 'constraint' naval CSBMs (e.g. ASW-free zones) are not only unverifiable, but would also disadvantage the forward-deployed US Navy far more than the Soviet Navy. The logic of the US Navy's position is clear enough.

US maritime policy as it evolved in the 1980s was designed to enhance deterrence and prevail militarily should deterrence nevertheless fail. A forward offensive strategy was seen as the most efficacious means of achieve these ends. Soviet 'constraint' CSBMs, by restraining the scope of US operations and exercises, would prevent the US from effectively practising its strategy. This would reduce US operational capability and hence undermine the credibility of the US deterrent posture. This in turn would increase the risk of aggression. Thus Soviet naval CSBM proposals were seen as likely to increase the risk of war.

Most of the CSBMs which naval arms control proposents sees as enhancing

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16) The Soviets claim that they too are a maritime power in the Pacific, that they too have important SLOCs to defend, and that 60% of the goods that move between the western and the far eastern regions of the Soviet Union go by sea. The West responds that, unlike the US, the Soviets have alternative means of transportation (the Trans-Siberian and Baikal railways).

security, the US Navy see as underming it. Thus while CSBM advocates argue in favor of greater transparency; the Navy believes that this would make its operations more calculable and facilitate the enemy's ability to counter them. CSBM advocates favour measures designed to reduce the risks of surprise attack; the Navy believes that surprise and initiative may be of critical tactical value in war. CSBM advocates argue that restraint on provocative exercises reduces the risks of accidental clashes which, in a crisis, could escalate into inadvertent war; the Navy believes that any constraints on its exercises will prevent it from practising them in a realistic manner.

But almost everything that the Navy sees as nessary to enhance deterrence - surprise, lack of predictability, a forward offensive strategy - may also be seen as destabilising. By destabilising I mean those military activities which increase tension and suspicion, provide incentives for arms races, for pre-emption in crises and for escalation if the threshold to war is crossed.

Evaluating the disagreements between proponents of naval CSBM regimes and their critics in the Navy is difficult - not least because different goals are being pursued. Both sides seek to enhance security, but the assumptions on which their strategies are based involve very different conceptions of what it is that constitutes the most probable causes of war. The US maritime strategy seeks to maintain and enhance deterrence against aggression; the goal of naval CSBM regimes, on the other hand, is to enhace crisis stability and reduce the risks of inadvertent war. CSBM regimes, in other words, seek to reassure potential adversaries. Some of the implications of these disagreements are discussed briefly in the conclusion.

9. The Bush Initiative on Tactical Nuclear Weapons

President Bush's announcement on September 27th that all US land and sea-based tactical nuclear weapons would be withdrawn worldwide has significant implications for regional security in general and regional arms control in particular.

First, it means that the US Navy's policy to 'neither confirm nor deny' (NCND) the presence of nuclear weapons on Navy ships is now inoperative.

This removes a major irritant from US relationships with a number of American allies - including Japan. It also creates the possibility of repairing the breach in the ANZUS alliance between Washington and New Zealand cause by the conflict between Wellington's anti-nuclear policy and the US NCND policy.

Second, it removes a major barrier to barrier to the US signing the South Pacific Nuclear weapons Free Zone Treaty. It should also serve to reduce US opposition to other maritime nuclear weapon free zone proposals like that for Southeast Asia. However, the President has made it clear that only some of the nuclear weapons which have been removed will be destroyed and that he wishes to retain the option of redeploying weapons which are not destoryed if necessary. Given this the Navy may well argue that NCND is merely suspended - not scrapped.

Third, the removal of nuclear weapons from the Korean peninsula also removes a major obstacle to to resolving the controversy over North Korea's nuclear weapons program. Pyongyang has long argued that before it would sign and implement a Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the US would have to remove its nuclear weapons from the South and stop posing a 'nuclear threat' to the North. The Bush decision to remove US tractical nuclear weapons from the South meets the first of the DPRK's demands, while the removal of tactical nuclear weapons from ships goes some way to meeting the second demand. The North Koreans also have an economic imperative for improving relations with countries like Japan and must now realise that such improvements are contingent on satisfying Japan (and the US) that they are no longer seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. But while movement on this issue is now a real possibility we should be cautious about being too optimistic.

First, there is nothing to stop the North legally stockpiling plutonium from its nuclear fuel reprocessing plant - as long as it remains under IAEA safeguards. The North could thus legally stockpile plutonium until it had sufficient for its nuclear weapons needs then withdrawn from the NPT and use the plutonium to build bombs.

Second, the Iraq experience demonstrates that a nation with safeguarded nuclear facilities may also run a large clandestine nuclear weapons program. If Iraq could do this there is no reason to assume that the even more secretive North Koreans could not do the same.

Australia

During the past year the Australian and Canadian foreign ministers have both called for multilateral security dialogues to be instituted in the region. Both governments have irritated the US in so doing, and the actual proposals of each are probably considerably less far-reaching than they would have been in the absence of US opposition. Within the region both proposals have also been subject to criticism.

Australian interest in regional CSBMS goes back at least to 1987 when then Foreign Minister Bill Hayden called for a 'superpower dialogue on security perceptions and concerns in the North Pacific'.[17] Hayden argued that although superpower deterrence in the region was robust the risk of inadvertent war was real. A security dialogue could to the negotiation of advanced notification of exercises and other 'transparency' CSBMs. Over time such agreements :

> ···could provide a foundation for more far-reaching measures such as limits on the size of exercises, or constraints on nature or location of such exercises.[18]

The US showed a predicatable lack of enthusiasm for these proposals which were subsequently pushed into the backburner by the Department of Foreign Affairs.

In July 1990, in a major speech at Melbourne University, Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans called for :

> ···new institutional processes that might be capable of evolving in Asia just as in Europe, as a framework for addressing and resolving security problems.[19]

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17) Bill Hayden, 'Security and Arms Control in the North Pacific', in Andrew Mack and Paul Keal (eds), *Security and Arms Control in the North Pacific* (Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1988). p.5.

18) Ibid. p.6/

19) Gareth Evans, 'What Asia Needs is a Europe-Style CSCA', *International Herald Tribune* (July 27, 1990).

The inspiration for these 'new proceses' was, of course, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and Evans called for 'a similar institutional arrangement, a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia.' (CSCA)[20] There was nothing particularly novel about the idea of an 'Asian Helsinki' - the Soviets had made such proposals on serveral occasions in the past. What was new was that the idea was being floated by a close regional ally of th US.

The choice of the term 'CSCA' was clearly unfortunate. Regional critics of the proposal have repeatedly pointed out that the Asia-Pacific region is fundamentally different from Europe. They argue that from this it follows that Europe-derived models are inappropriate for Asia. The Indonesians and Malaysian, who continue to promote the ZOPFAN concept, and the Japanese, who continue to promote the ZOPFAN concept, and the Japanese, who follow the US line, were particularly critical.

The US predictably enough rejected the CSCA idea and in November 1990, US Secretary of State, James Baker, worte to Senator Evans telling him to drop it.[21]

Uninformed criticisms of the CSCA idea have persisted even though Evans has clarified his position on a number of occasions. For example, of the constantly repeated argument that CSCA is 'inappropriate' for Asia, Evans has noted that :

> Nobody is naive enough to think that the CSCE process can simply be recreated in the Asia-Pacific region. There are too many obvious difference for that : no single East-West confrontation to contend with, but a heterogenous collection of cross-cutting cultures and conflicts and cleavages. But just because institutional processes can't be translated half a world away, that is not to say that the relevant habits of mind cannot be translated either.[22]

But although the European CSCE model may not be appropriate for the Asia-Pacific strategic environment, the security philosophy which underpins that model is

20) Ibid.
21) See David Lague, "Regional Security Despite US Objection", *Financial Review* (April 12, 1991).
22) Gareth Evans, "The Asia Pacific and Global Change". Address to the Trilateral Commission, Tokyo, April 20, 1991. p.6.

appropriate.

The term 'CSCA' is rarely used by Australian officials these days. Indeen it is instructive that when Richard Woolcott, Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, addressed the Manila seminar on ASEAN-Asia Pacific Security Cooperation in June 1991, the term 'CASA' was not Australian policy to call for 'new institutions' - precisely what Gareth Evans had done just a year earlier.

In may 1991, the Prime Minster gave a major speech on 'Australia's Security in Asia' which is the definitive statement on this issue at the present time. Mr Hawake said that :

> We do not think it is appropriate or necessary at this stage to propose the establishment of a new regional forum or institutions for discussing security issues. It is not yet possible to say whether such forums or institutions would have a useful role. In particular we must recongnised that we cannot translate the emerging European security architecture into our own region.[23]

More positively the Prime Minister argued that regional security dialogues could lead to confidence-building measures such as :

> ···procedures agreed among regional states for handling naval incidents at sea. Increased cooperation in such areas as maritime surveillance, air-space surveillance and intelgence exchanges could also grow out of regional dialogue on mutual security needs. But Australia would not support proposals for naval arms control or other measures which might inhibit the freedom of naval operations in international waters.[24]

The proposals for cooperative surveillance and regional incidents at sea agreements are under active discussion within the bureaucracy in Canberra and consultations with regional states on this issue are on going.

Canada

In July 1990, Canadian Security of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark gave three

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23) R. J. Hawke, 'Australia's Security in Asia', The Asia-Australia Institute, Sydney, May 24, 1991. p.10.

24) *Ibid* p.11. The last statement contradicts the first. INCSEA agreements are designed to 'inhibit the freedom of naval operations in international waters'. Unconstrained 'freedom of the seas' can be dangerous.

speeches proposing 'new habits of dialogue and cooperation' in the Asia-Pacific region. The idea was to create a 'North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue'.

Central to Canadian approach is the idea of 'cooperative security', which Paul Evans, one of the York University academics associated with the Candian initiative, has described as follows :

> It is based on the twin ideas that threats to security, in addition to the traditional military ones, are increasingly diverse and multidimensional, involving such factors as economic underdeveleopment, trade disputes, population movements and growth, environmental degradations, oppression, human rights abuses, terrorism, the illicit traffic in drugs. The second idea is that the management of these problems is best handled through multilateral channels involving a process of discussion, negotitation, cooperation and compromise.[25]

Like Australia, Canada called for the adaption to the Pacific region of confidence-building measures '···which have proven successful in Europe.'[26] Like Australia, Canada also backtracked on its proposal. In April, 1991 Clark argued that he was not :

> ···advocating that we transplant mechanisms that have been successful elsewhere, notably in Europe, into the unique, political and cultural context of the Asia Pacific region.[27]

Within the region the Candian proposal has had a mixed reception. In Japan, Prime Minister Kaifu described it as 'premature'. Some American and Japanese officials say privately that they cannot see why Canda should be a security dialogue partner in their region since it is not part of it. Unlike the US, they say, Canada is not forward-deployed in Northeast Asia, and it has neither alliance relationships in the region, nor

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25) Paul M. Evans, 'Proposals for Confidence-building and Conflict Resolution Mechanisms for the Pacific : the Prospects for Multilateralism', paper presented to the Fifth Asia-Pacific Roundtable on Confidence Building and Conflict Reduction in the Pacific (June 1991). p.9~10.

26) Joe Clark cited in *Pacific Research* (August 1990) p.21.

27) Speeche to North Pacific Security Dialogue conference, Victoria, British Columbia by Right Honourable Joe Clark. April 6, 1991. p.5.

traditional security interests. Australia, which was not invited to join the Canadian initiative has been somewhat cool towards it, while the Canadians have not been supportive of the Australia CSCA proposal.

Sensitive to likely regional opposition, ottawa has stressed that it is not seeking to establish new institutions, nor advocating the transplant of institutions which have been successful elsewhere. The North Pacific initiative is not intended to interfere in bilateral relationships, nor sensitive political issues, nor is there any intention to launch any regional arms control initiatives.[28] In fact the Canadians were much clearer about what they were not seeking to do than what they were.

Ottawa was insistent about the desirability of creating a multiateral 'cooperative security dialogue' but argued that dialogue would not involve 'specific negotiating objectives'.[29]

Given this, it is not clear why the US should be so opposed to the Canadian initiative. In part the answer has to do with Washington's worries about 'slippery slopes', but the US is also concerned that the strong stress on multilateralism which characterises the bilateral security relationships which the US has with various regional 'powers.

It is not surprising that the US should prefer a seried of bilateral security relationship to a multilateral regime or regimes. In the former case the US will be the dominant partner in every relationship; in the latter, Washington would confront the possibility of coalitions of resistance on specific issues - as sometimes happened in its relationship with its NATO allies. But while US preferences are understandable, what is in the perceived US interest is not necessarily in the interest of other states in the region.

Deterrence Versus Reassurance

Although Australia is one of America's closest allies there is an element in Gareth

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28) Right Honourable Joe Clark, Speech to North Pacific Dialogue Conference, Victoria, April 6, 1991. p.5.

29) *Ibid.* p.5.

Evans' security philosophy which has no counterpart in the security thinking of the US - at least with respect to the Asia-Pacific region.

While Senator Evans no longer talks about a CSCE-type institutional framework for CSBMs, in April 1991 he spelled out the common security philosophy which underpinned both CSCE and his CSCA concept:

> The central idea of 'common security' is that lasting security does not lie in the upward spiral of arms development, fuelled by mutual suspicion, but in a commitment to joint survival, to taking into account the legitimate security anxieties of others, to building step-by-step military confidence between nations, to working to maximise the degree of interdependence between nations : putting it shortly, to achieving security with others and not against them.[30]

It is, in other words, the CSCE philosophy of 'common security' which is important for the Asia-Pacific region - not the institutional embodiment of that philosophy in Europe - a region whose strategic and political geography is very different from that of Asia. Common security strategies seek above all to reassure potential adversaries.

The philosophy of common security has almost no place in US strategic thinking in the Pacific. US strategy in the region is based on a robust 'peace through strength' philosophy. Since the US sees deterrence as the primary means of maintaining security and a forward offensive strategy as the best way of maintaining deterrence, it is not surprising that the precepts of common security have little interest for Washington or Pacific Command.

Most of Washington's friends and allies in the region also embrace the 'peace through strength' philosophy - which is one reason why, in a time of strategic uncertainty, defence budgets are soaring in the region.

'Peace through strength' is an understandable axiom on which to base a security policy. After all what else should armed forces do but seek to deter war and prevail on the battlefield should deterrence nonetheless fails?

It is also true that reassurance strategies are inappropriate in certain situations. It makes no sense seeking to reassure aggressors like Saddam Hussein or Hitler -

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30) Evans, 'The Asia Pacific and Global Change'. p.4.

indeed reassurance strategies may amount in practice to appeasement and encourage the very war they seek to prevent.

Arms control advocates argue that one of the virtues of CSBMs is that they reduce the risks of surprise attack and increase predictability. But surprise attack and unpredictability may be seen as strategically advantageous by proponents of offensive deterrence.

But while inadeguate deterrent postures may invite aggression, too heavy an emphasis on 'peace through strength' strategies, especially those which emphasise offensive deterrence, may exacerbate the conditions which lead to inadvertent war.

An effective security policy should seek to balance the requirements of deterrence againts those of reassurance. This is what policies of common security seek to achieve.

Conclusions

First, CSBM regimes in the region, if they are to have any practical effect, will have a strong maritime element. In Europe, land forces and airpower were the dominant factors in the East/West confrontation. In the Asia-Pacific region the maritime dimension of security is also far more salient. The US the dominant power in the region, relies primarily on its maritime forces, while many key regional states are islands (Japan, Australia, Taiwan, Indonesia, the Philippins, Taiwan and Singapore, with South Korea being a de facto island in that it has no land links to the rest of the region). For all of these states, EEZ protection and the security of sea lines of communication (SLOCs) are obviously a critical national security still further for them.

Second, the US Navy's continued resistance to any constraints on its activities on the high seas looks increasingly anachronistic in a maritime world of 'creeping jurisdiction' by littoral states and growing international maritime regulation across a range of issues. The US is currently also in the rather odd position of opposing maritime CSBMs for regional states - like INCSEA agreements - which it finds valuable for itself.

Third, there is a clear regional consensus that any CSBM process should start modestly - perhaps bilaterally and certainly sub-regionally. The most obvious sub-regions are North-East Asia, South-East Asia and the South-West Pacific.

Fourth, there seems to be a high degree of consensus within the region that bilateral and multilateral security dialogues are a sensible starting point for the process of regional confidence-building and that attempts to create institutional structures for CSBM regimes are, at the moment, premature.

Fifth, while discussions on military doctrine might seem to be a useful starting point in any regional security dialogue, some defence planners, particularly those of a more pragmatic bent, will resist invitations to plunge into the often abstruse realms of strategic doctrine - suspecting that much of it has little relevance to their practical concerns. Such attitudes are no necessary barrier to progress. Security goals may be reached by different paths, and it may also be useful to have discussions on discrete practical measures whose immediate strategic untility is self-evident, but which also contribute to the broader goal of achieving common security. Two such possibilities are described in the Ball and chapter.

Sixth, a number of states - including Canda, China and Malaysia - have suggested that security dialogue should start at the non-go vern ment al level. Canadian policy is of interest here. The Canadian cooperative Dial ogue initiative involves both an official and a non-offical track. The non-official track funded by the government, but is being organised by York University. It involves a series of workshop/conferences which bring together scholars and regional security experts to discuss a range of North Pacific security issues. The annual Kuala Lumpur Roundtables and the UN Kathmandu meetings also involve a mix of scholars and officials acting in their 'private capacity'. A number of analysts have noted the useful role played by the non-governmental Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (PECC) in paving the way for the official Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) institution. Non-governmental meetings on security, analogous to those of PECC could, they suggest, facilitate a subsequent official security dialogue.

Finally, if we accept that both reassurance and deterrence are necessary ingredients of a sensible security policy, it follows that the most critical challenge for

security planners is to find the correct balance between reassuring and deterring potential adversaries - between, as Gareth Evans puts it, seeking security with other states and seeking security against them. Seeking the appropriate balance will never be easy - not least because deterrence and reassurance strategies are sometimes antithetical.

Whether deterrence or reassurance should be accorded priority in strategic planning will depend on the prevailing strategic circumstance. For most states in the Asia-Pacific region today unprovoked aggression is not perceived as the primary security problem, yet the deterrence/reassurance balance is tilted heavily towards deterrence and 'peace through' strategies. Too many resources go to defence hardware, not enough towards non-military approaches to enchancing security.

If the general thrust of this argument is accepted, it follows that there is a compelling case for regional security planners to place greater emphasis on reassurance strategies. In practical terms this is an argument for the institution of security dialogues, for the negotiation of CSBM regimes and other non-military approaches to enhancing security, for restraint in military build-ups - especially of offensive weapons, and defence - dominant strategies and force postures in defence planning for the future.

국문요약

아시아 태평양지역의 군비통제

앤드류 맥

 지난 몇 년 동안 아시아 태평양지역에서는 군비통제에 대한 실질적인 조치들이 거의 이루어지지 않았음에도 불구하고 이에 대한 관심은 점증해 왔다. 이 지역의 군비통제에 대한 관심은 전력감축보다는 신뢰구축조치(CBMs)에 더욱 집중되어 있다.

 이러한 관심에도 불구하고 아직까지 이 지역에서의 신뢰구축이 실제적으로 무엇을 의미하는가에 대해서는 확실한 개념적 정의가 없는 것 같다. 아시아지역에서의 신뢰구축은 유럽안보협력회의(The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe)와 내용과 안보철학 면에서 그 성질을 달리한다.

 신뢰구축의 개념은 일반적으로 "국가들을 신뢰하는 마음과 믿음을 더욱 확실히하는 과정"이라고 말할 수 있다. 신뢰구축조치는 따라서 전력감축이 아닌 어떤 다른 조치들을 의미한다.

 신뢰구축조치(CSBMs)는 보통 몇가지 개념으로 나뉘어 사용된다. 첫째가 정치적 신뢰구축조치로서 불가침협정을 선언하는 것등이 포함된다. 둘째는 투명적 신뢰구축조치라 불릴 수 있는 것으로 이는 정치적 신뢰구축과는 달리 반드시 신뢰를 전제로 하지 않고 대신 광범위한 안보이슈들에 대한 정보교환을 주목적으로 삼는다. 셋째는 억제적 신뢰구축조치로 이것은 잠재적으로 불안정을 초래할지도 모르는 군사작전, 군대배치 등을 금지 또는 제한시키는 것으로 비무장지대 같은 것이 포함된다. 넷째는 방어위주의 전력구조와 전략을 들 수 있다.

 최근에 아시아 태평양지역에서는 여러 형태의 신뢰구축조치들이 행해지고 있는데 특히 소련, 미국, 오스트레일리아, 카나다등의 국가들이 각기 다른 신뢰구축에 대한 태도를 보이고 있다.

 결론적으로 첫째 이 지역의 신뢰구축조치가 실질적인 것이 되려면 특히 해군전력에 중점을 두어야 한다. 둘째 미해군의 이 지역 신뢰구축에 대한 반발은 시대착오적이다. 셋째, 신뢰구축과정은 매우 온건하게 시작되어야 한다. 넷째, 이러한 신뢰구축과정은 쌍무적이거나 다원적인 관계국가간의 대화에서 시작되어야 하며 어떤 제도적 장치를 만들려는 시도는 아직 시기상조이다. 다섯째, 신뢰구축조치는 비정부간 레벨에서 출발하는 것이 바람직하다.