

Rethinking State Structure : Japan and South Korea in Comparative Perspective*

*Cho Moon-boo***

Contents

- I . The Problematique
- II . Argument : Dimensions of State Structure
- III . The Case : Convergence and Divergence of State Structure in Japan and South Korea
- IV . Conclusion : Explaining Variations

I. The Problematique

Several theories have been suggested in accounting for the anomalous economic success of East Asian countries focusing such variables as culture, market, the state, geopolitics, and history.¹⁾ Of these, the statist paradigm has been the most pronounced theory of the

* This article is drawn partly on Mun-Boo Cho and Chung-in Moon, "State Structure and Policy Choice : Japan and South Korea in Comparative Perspective," which was presented at the annual convention of International Studies Association, Vancouver, Canada, March 20-23, 1991. I would like to thank Dr. Chung-in Moon for his comments and assistance in preparing this article.

** Department of Public Administration Cheju National University, Cheju, South Korea

1) For a comparative overview, see Lucian Pye, *Asian Power and Politics* (Cambridge : Harvard Univ. Press, 1985); Roy Hofheinz and Ken calder, *The Eastasia Edge* (New York : Basic

East Asian political economy.” The statist argue that the splendid economic performance of East Asian countries has stemmed from the choice and implementation of coherent, consistent, and flexible economic policies, which has not only dictated and perfected market functioning, but also minimized market distortion.

Statists claim that efficient and effective transformation of state objectives into actual policy outcomes has been in turn facilitated by internal organizational features of the state that are rather unique to the East Asian countries. The East Asian state is perceived to be an internally cohesive, unitary actor, where executive dominance has minimized bureaucratic infighting, and the unity of bureaucratic purpose has remained consistent. Furthermore, the state is viewed as constantly penetrating and prevailing over civil society, through which the state has been able to insulate economic decision-making from contending societal pressures. This has been possible not only because of the authoritarian tradition widely prevalent in East Asia, but also because of a large pool of policy instruments (e.g., credit, tax, and licensing) in the hands of the state.³⁾

This statist paradigm significantly makes up for several shortcomings of the neoclassical model and allows us to look into the dynamics determinants of economic growth in the East Asia. Nevertheless, the statist paradigm raises several interesting questions: Is it possible to regard the East Asian state as an internally cohesive and unitary actor? Is the East Asian state really strong and autonomous? Are there causal links among state structure, policy choices, and economic outcomes? More importantly, is it plausible to make generalizations on the relationships between state structure and economic performance that can be commonly applicable to the East Asian countries as a whole?

These issues have become the subjects of increasingly intense scholarly debates in re-

books, 1982); Frederic Deyo (ed.), *The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism* (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1987); Gary Gereffi and Don Wyman (eds.), *Manufacturing Miracles* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1990).

- 2) On statist theorie of East Asian development, see Stephan Haggard, *Pathways from the Periphery* (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1990); Alice Amsden, *Asia's Nex Giant* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1989); Chalmers Johnson, "Political Institutions and Economic Performance: The Government and Business Relationships in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan," in F. Deyo, op.cit., pp.136~164; Chalmers Johnson, *MITI and Japanese Miracle* (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1982); Leroy Jones and Il Sakong, *Government, Business and Entrepreneurship in Economic Development: The Korean Case* (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1980); Stephan Haggard and chung-in Moon, "Liberal, Dependent, or Mercantile?: The Korean State in the International Economy," John Ruggie (ed.), *Antinomies of Interdependence* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983).

- 3) See works by haggard, Johnson, and Amsden.

cent years. The mythical binary classification of the state and civil society has been under heavy critiques with the advent of revisionist interpretations of state strength. Though limited in the case of the East Asian NICs,⁴⁾ the Japanese case has yielded rich alternative interpretations. Patterned pluralism,⁵⁾ bureaucrat-led mass-inclusive pluralism,⁶⁾ compartmentalized competition,⁷⁾ canalized pluralism,⁸⁾ and network theories⁹⁾ are exemplary of these new approaches. Significant research efforts have also been made to disaggregate and differentiate state structure and underlying coalitional bases of the East Asian NICs.¹⁰⁾ The validity of the causal links involving state strength, policy choice and economic performance in the South Korean context has also been questioned.¹¹⁾

Nevertheless, this revisionist literature can be characterized by either one country studies or comparative studies of the East Asian NICs. Despite analytical and empirical importance,¹²⁾ very little attention has been paid to the comparative study of Japan and her regional rivals such as the East Asian NICs. This study is a preliminary effort to shed new lights on the ongoing debates on the East Asian political economy by elucidating the similarities and differences of state structure in Japan and South Korea.

-
- 4) On the revisionist interpretation, see Stephan Haggard and Chung-in Moon, "Institutions and Economic Growth: Theory and the Korean Case," *World Politics* 42:2 (January 1990); Chung-in Moon, "Beyond Statism: The Political Economy of Growth in South Korea," *International Studies Notes* (Winter, 1990); Tun-Jen Cheng, "Political Regimes and Development Strategies," in Gereffi and Wyman, op. cit., pp.110~138.
 - 5) Michio Muramatsu and Ellis S. Krauss, "The Conservative Policy Line and the Development of Patterned Pluralism," in Kozo Yamamura and Yasukichi Yasuba (eds.), *The Political Economy of Japan* Vol. 1 (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1987), pp.516~554. Also see Muramatsu's *Sengo Nihon no Kanryosei* (The Bureaucratic System in Postwar Japan) (Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1982).
 - 6) Takashi Inoguchi, *Gendai nihon Seijikeizai no Kozu-Seifu to Shijo* (Framework of Contemporary Japanese Political Economy-Government and Market) (Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1983).
 - 7) Yasusuke Murakami, "The Japanese Model of Political Economy," in Yamamura and Yasuba, op. cit., pp.33~92.
 - 8) Seizaburo Sato and Tetsuhisa Matsuzaki, "Jiminto Chochoki Seiken no Kaibo," (The anatomy of the Super-Long-Term Liberal Democratic Party Regime), *Chuo Koron* (November 1984), pp.66~100.
 - 9) Daniel Okimoto, *Between MITI and the Market* (Seattle: Univ. of Washington Press, 1990).
 - 10) See articles in Gereffi and Wyman and Deyo.
 - 11) Chung-in Moon, "Beyond Statism...", op. cit.
 - 12) Bruce Cumings, "The Origins and Development of the Northeast Asian Political Economy," *International Organization* 38:1 (Winter 1984), pp.1~40.

II. Argument : Dimensions of State Structure

What is state structure? Inasmuch as the concept of the state is evasive, state structure is also an ambiguous notion.¹³⁾ In this article, I follow the Weberian tradition simply because in contrast to marxian and neo-Marxian traditions in which the concept of the state is reified and abstract, Weber gives much more concrete and tangible definition of the state. The following passage from Max Weber reveals a rather clear view of the modern state :

The modern state is a compulsory association which organizes domination. It has been successful in seeking to monopolize the legitimate use of physical force as a means of domination within a territory. To this end the state has combined the material means of organization in the hands of leaders, and it has expropriated all autonomous functionaries of estates who formerly controlled these means in their own right. The state has taken their positions and now stands in the top place.¹⁴⁾

Explicit in this passage is that the *raison d'être* of the state is the domination through the legitimate use of physical force. And the state is composed of two components : leaders and all autonomous functionaries. Put it in contemporary terms, the state can be defined as the combination of political leadership and public bureaucracy. Strictly speaking, then, state structure can be viewed as the distribution of power and the subsequent patterns of interactions between political leadership and public bureaucracy.¹⁵⁾ However, political leadership and bureaucracy cannot exist in separation from civil society. Therefore, a third element, namely, social constituents of political leadership and bureaucrats, should be taken into account. In view of the above, state structure can be operationalized in terms of four major dimensions : executive (political) leadership, the

13) For an overview of statist debates in Korea, see Kang Min et. al., *Kukga wa Gongong Jungchaek* (The State and Public Policy) (Seoul : Bubmunsa, 1991), especially chapters 1-3 and 6; Kim Kwang-woong, *Hankukui Gwanryoje Yonku* (Study of Korea's Bureaucratic System) (Seoul : Daiyoungmunwhasa, 1991).

14) Max Weber, "Politics as Vocation," in Hans Gerth and Wright Mills (eds.), *From Max Weber : Essays in Sociology* (Oxford : Oxford Univ. Press, 1958), pp.82~83.

15) On the concept of state structure, see Kang Min, "Hankuk Kukga Liron ui Jaijomyeong (Reflections on Korea's State Theories)," in Kang Min (et. al), op. cit., pp.183~207.

executive-bureaucratic nexus, intra-bureaucratic dynamics, and social constituents.

The most important component of state structure is executive leadership which can be defined in terms of power, autonomy, and objectives of political leader (namely, the chief executive), be it president or prime minister. Regardless of institutional arrangements, the chief executive can be considered to be the hallmark of constitutionally defined administrative authority (the state) and of political power either endowed by electoral procedures or consolidated through party politics or authoritarian maneuver. Therefore, policy outcomes can be viewed primarily as a function of executive leadership choice. Power and autonomy of the chief executive are not unlimited, however. In reality, they are constrained by several factors: the checks and balances mechanism constitutionally defined, especially counterbalancing roles by the legislative and judicial branches; the coalitional politics within the ruling regime, and ultimately electoral cycles and constituent pressures.¹⁶⁾

Equally important is the executive-bureaucratic nexus. The chief executive realizes its political goals through constant interactions with public bureaucracy. In principle, bureaucrats are subordinated to the chief executive, but in reality, the relationships between the two vary. In countries where executive dominance prevails, bureaucrats seldom enjoy their autonomy and power, and policy-making processes involve a top-down mode. On the contrary, in countries where the executive leadership is diffused, bureaucrats tend to enjoy a higher degree of power and autonomy in policy formulation and implementation, and policymaking processes involve a bottom-up pattern. Depending on the nature of this nexus, be it vertical, horizontal, or mixed, policy choices and implementation can vary.¹⁷⁾

Public bureaucracy constitutes the most active agent of state structure. It is through bureaucratic agencies that policies are initially formulated and implemented. But bureaucratic agencies are not unitary, but involve organizational complexities with diverse and often conflicting ideologies, preferences, and interests. The pattern of intra-bureaucratic interactions is defined as bureaucratic dynamics. When bureaucratic dynamics is characterized by a high degree of unity in purpose and mutual accommodation and consultation, better policy performance can be expected. On the other hand, if public

16) See Stephen Krasner, *Defending National Interests* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1978).

17) The executive-bureaucratic nexus is a least studied area. In the Korean context, see Chung jung-gil, "Daitongryungui Jungchaek Gyljunggwa Junmungwanryoui Yokwhal (Presidential Policy-making and the Role of Professional Bureaucrats) *Hankuk Haengjung Hakbo* 23:1 (June 1989).

bureaucratic agencies are divisive, fragmentary, and confrontational, the opposite can be expected. Bureaucratic dynamics usually depends on the nature of the executive-bureaucratic nexus where the higher the executive dominance, the stronger the bureaucratic unity. And vice versa. Nevertheless, such variables as historical formation of inter-agency rivalry, sectionalism, and compartmentalization within public bureaucracy also influence the the nature of bureaucratic dynamics and the resulting policy choices and implementation.¹⁸⁾

Finally, no matter how the domination through the legitimate use of physical force is endowed with, political leadership and bureaucracy, which constitute the state, do not formulate and implement public policies in separation from civil society. In fact, they are designed to perceive, filter, and translate preferences and interests of civil society into a set of decisions, actions, and policies. In the ideal democratic setting, political society comprising political parties and legislative branch is supposed to play a role of conduit linking civil society to the state by aggregating, articulating, and translating societal interests, while bureaucratic agents are to be free from constituent pressures. In reality, however, public bureaucracy, as with political leadership, is not a neutral organizational island, but a politicized entity, which is beholden to corresponding social groups and is obliged to represent and protect their interests. Business associations, labor unions, farmers' association, and so on are good examples in this regard. These social forces directly linked to bureaucratic agents are termed as bureaucratic (social) constituents. In authoritarian regimes where political parties and legislative branch play insignificant and ineffectual roles, bureaucratic constituents emerge as a key factor of shaping the nature of state structure. The pattern of bureaucrat-constituent links and the size and resources of constituents greatly influence the relative power of bureaucratic agency as well as the nature of executive-bureaucratic nexus, and subsequently policy outcomes.

Policy choices and their implementation are then a function of the dynamic interplay of these four variables. A caveat is in order, however. The configuration of state structure delineated above is not fixed, but varies over time and across sector. Depending on the nature of political regime in power, internal and external policy environments, and specific policy-issue area, state structure show divergent interactions among its components. Nevertheless, it seems plausible to elucidate the ideal typical structuration of the state by examining its historical trajectory.

18) Bureaucratic dynamics here can be understood as bureaucratic politics.

III. The Case : Convergence and Divergence of State Structure in Japan and South Korea

It has been often assumed or argued that Japan and South Korea share structural and behavioral similarities in their state structure. Lucian Pye, in his *Asian Power and Politics*, asserts that Confucian culture has been responsible for institutional similarities between Japan and Korea.¹⁹⁾ On the other hand, Bruce Cumings attributes the state formation of South Korea to Japanese colonial legacy (i.e., inheritance of colonial state structure).²⁰⁾ Chalmers Johnson also emphasizes the similarity between Japan and South Korea by

Table 1. Comparative Overview of State Structure in Japan and South Korea

	Japan	South Korea
Chief Executive	constrained by LDP factionalism/ electoral cycles	dominant/ weak legislative/ no visible constraint
Executive-bureaucrat nexus	bottom-up/ relative autonomy from executive/ horizontal	top-down/ low autonomy/ vertical
Intra-bureaucratic dynamics	sectionalism/ compartmentalized/ mediating role by LDP/conflictual	compartmentalized/ sectionalism/ conflictual/ chief executive intervention as conflict resolution mode
Bureaucratic constituents	tight, closed ties/ inclusive/ consultative mechanism/organic symbiosis	tight, closed ties/ exclusive/ commanding structure/functional interdependence

19) Lucian Pye, *op. cit.*

20) Cumings, *op. cit.*

focusing on the common theme of capitalist development.²¹⁾ Educational background of administrative elites, personal connections, and the continuing emulation process on the part of South Korea have also been cited as factors accountable for Japan-Korean similarity.

As table 1. illustrates, however, state structures in Japan and South Korea are more divergent than convergent.

First, while power, autonomy, and influence of the chief executive (namely prime minister) in Japan are fundamentally constrained, South Korea reveals a very high degree of executive dominance. In Japan, prime minister is supposed to exercise enormous power and influence. In reality, however, that is not the case. Leadership style varies from one prime minister to another. For example, Yoshida, Ikeda, Sato, and Nakasone are usually characterized as being strong prime ministers. On the other hand, Hatoyama, Kishi, Miki, Ohira, and Kaifu are considered rather weak.

Apart from leadership style, various factors limit the scope and nature of executive dominance in Japan. First of all, precarious factional politics within the conservative ruling coalition constrains executive power. In the Japanese ruling coalition, no single faction dominates, and the selection of prime minister is undertaken through dynamic coalition building. Therefore, those who are elected to prime minister should respond to, and accommodate, various demands from supporting factions. For example, Nakasone was a strong figure in leadership style, but as Japanese mass media ridiculed his administration as "Nakasone" administration, his leadership was fundamentally limited by the Tanaka faction, which helped him get elected prime minister.²²⁾

In addition to constraints imposed from factional politics, the limited, but relatively active legislative branch, and the electoral cycles undermine the scope and nature of Japanese executive power in one way or another. Since the Liberal Democratic Party has been de facto the dominant party, legislative challenges from Socialist Party, Komeito (Clean Party), and Communist Party have been limited. However, their challenges can become very formidable if electoral cycles are not supportive of the ruling LDP. Japanese politics has shown five major electoral/institutional cycles: the formative period of Hoshu Honryu (1945-dation of power by LDP (late 1950s to early 1960s); the rise of new middle

21) Johnson in Deyo op. cit.

22) On factional politics in Japan, see B. Richardson and S. Flanagan, *Politics-Japan* (Boston: Little and Brown, 1984), chapter 3 and 7.

class and challenges to the LDP dominance (1974~1980); conservative resurgence (1980~1986); the rise of patterned pluralism and new challenges to conservative dominance (since 1986).²³⁾ Given the above classification, it can be asserted that Japanese prime ministers enjoyed relatively high degree of executive dominance during the 1945~1973 period and suffered from weak executive power during 1974~1980 and after 1986.

In contrast, chief executives of South Korea have consistently enjoyed a high degree of power and autonomy. First, ruling parties have virtually been subjugated to arbitrary rule of chief executives. Liberal Party under Rhee, Democratic Republic Party under Park Chung-Hee, Democratic Justice Party under Chun Doo-Hwan, and even Democratic Liberal party under Roh Tai-Woo have all shown limited or no influence on president. These ruling parties have become privatized by chief executives. Factional politics have existed within the ruling parties, but presidents have always been above the factional politics. The only exception is the Second Republic under Chang Myon. Even after democratic transition in 1987, the ruling party does not appear to exercise any autonomy and power over president. In view of the above, it can be safely concluded that chief executives in Korea have enjoyed much higher degree of executive dominance than their counterparts in Japan.²⁴⁾

Up until very recently, legislative oversight and checks and balances did not exist. Legislative branch was nothing but a rubber stamp. President and his secretariat (the Blue House) has played the role of a small cabinet standing above the regular cabinet. The chronic paralysis of the electoral system symptomatic of authoritarian regime has also deepened executive dominance by making the chief executive less responsive to grassroots pressures. Of course, this does not imply that chief executives did not respond to pressures from grassroots at all. Even under authoritarian setting, chief executives have shown sensitivity to electoral cycles. An evidence for this can be found in chronic fiscal expansion before and during election years. Nevertheless, electoral cycles did not impose any significant constraints on chief executives.

The executive-bureaucrat nexus also shows divergent patterns.²⁵⁾ Japan is characterized by the bottom-up pattern, in which bureaucracy plays a major role in formulating and

23) Muramatsu and Krauss, op. cit., pp.516~554.

24) See Jone and Sakong, op. cit., chapter 3.

25) Yung H. Park, *Bureaucrats and Ministers in Contemporary Japanese Government* (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, Univ. of California, 1986), p.12; Muramatsu, op. cit., p.194. Also see, Okabe Shiro, *Gyosei Kanri* (Administrative Management) (Tokyo: Yubikaku, 1970).

implementing policies. Although prime ministers lay a macroframework within which detailed policies are mapped out, they cannot directly intervene or interfere with ministry-level policy-making. According to two laws (*Kokka Gyosei Soshikiho* and *Kokka Komuinho*), the minister (daijin) has broad powers over policy-making, implementation, expenditures, and personnel. In practicality, however, lower officials (zokkan) initiate all policy proposals (ringisho) and supervise their implementations. Especially, directors of division (kacho) play most important roles in this importance of division director at each ministry in the following manner :

Those who hold higher positions than Kacho seldom take opposing positions against minister or prime minister. If you give them some pocket money, or promise promotion, or pledge to become a political patron, they instantly become loyal. Perhaps Kwajoo are the only ones who are selfless and concern about Japan.²⁶⁾

Several factors explain this phenomenon. Meritocracy deeply rooted in the historical formation of Japanese bureaucracy ensures professional autonomy of lower level officials. Lower officials do not have to concern about their promotion as long as they work hard. At the same time, they are those who possess technical expertise and are familiar with pending policy issues. Finally, the power and the mediating role of minister and vice minister for political affairs help bureaucrats in Japan enjoy the privileged position where bureaucratic agencies are relatively insulated from arbitrary influence peddling by prime minister.

South Korea is quite opposite. The executive-bureaucrat nexus has traditionally been rigidly vertical. It can be termed as "sunflower (haebaragi)" model in which both junior and senior bureaucrats radiate around chief executives or Blue House. President exercises virtually unrestricted command and control over bureaucracy, and, therefore, bureaucrats have played the lesser salient role in formulating and implementing public policies. Put it differently, Korean bureaucrats can be described very much as the mechanical agents of formulating and implementing policies that are congruent primarily with president's preferences and interests. Chief executives can interfere with minor details of policy contents such as landscaping design of highways (Park Chung-Hee) and method of highway paving (cement paving under Chun). Korean bureaucrats, both low and high, do not

26) Requoted from Sataka Makoto, *Nihon Kanryo Hakusho* (Whitebook on Japanese Bureaucracy) (Tokyo : Kodansha, 1986), pp.67~68.

exercise any significant autonomy and power.

The lack of bureaucratic autonomy vis-a-vis the chief executive and the vertical nexus can be attributed to several factors. First, the concentration of administrative, personnel power in the hands of president undermines bureaucratic autonomy. President or Blue House can arbitrary intervene in recruitment, positioning, and punishment of bureaucrats. Second, ministers and vice ministers cannot play a role of political shield protecting bureaucrats. On the contrary, their blind loyalty drives middle-to-low level bureaucrats to conduct a similar behavior of compliance and subjugation. Finally, the lack of bureaucratic neutrality and professionalism also fosters structural dependency of bureaucrats on chief executive, further delimiting their power and autonomy.²⁷⁾

Bureaucratic dynamics in Japan and South Korea reveals both similarities and differences. Despite similar cultural traits, close school ties, and the unity of purpose, high degree of sectionalism and compartmentalization and intense inter-agency rivalry characterize the Japanese bureaucracy.²⁸⁾ Thus, forming consensus and reaching compromise among bureaucratic agencies require prudent, time-consuming negotiation processes. Minimum commitment and muddling-through become the basic rules for resolving bureaucratic politics. Prime Minister plays an important role in mediating contending agencies, but the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (especially, Policy Affairs Research Council : seimu chosakai) serves as the critical mediator in resolving bureaucratic infighting.

Bureaucratic sectionalism and compartmentalization also exist in South Korea, and inter-agency rivalry has traditionally been fierce.²⁹⁾ Rivalry among Economic Planning Board, Ministry of Finance, and Ministry of Commerce and Industry are a good example in this regard. However, the intensity of bureaucratic divisiveness is not as strong as in Japan. Executive dominance, clearly defined hierarchial ordering of ministries, and rather frequent circulation of economic bureaucrats minimize such deep cleavages. There are several inter-ministrial consultative mechanism such as Economic Ministers' Consultative meeting designed to resolve any inter-bureaucratic conflicts and to enhance inter-agency

27) Paik, Wan-ki, *Hankukui Hoengjung Munwa* (Administrative Culture of Korea) (Seoul : Ilchogak, 1984).

28) See Murakami, op. cit.

29) Kim, Kwangwoong, "Kukga Gwanryo ui Jungchaek Ihae (Policy Interests of State Bureaucrats)," in Korea Political Science Associatio (ed.), *Hyundai Hankuk Junggokwa Kukga* (Contemporary Korean Politics and the State) (Seoul : Bubmunsa, 1987).

cooperation. Those issues which cannot be resolved in these various inter-ministrial meetings are ultimately determined by the chief executive. The ruling party has limited power in resolving inter-agency conflicts.³⁰⁾

Finally, Japan and South Korea share both similarity and difference in the pattern of interactions between bureaucracy and its social constituents. Conventionally speaking, social constituents refer to interest groups which are supposed to represent and articulate their interests and preferences through party politics. However, due to both authoritarian nature and executive branch's preemptive power prevalent in both countries, though they vary in degree, interest groups tend to directly interact with bureaucratic agencies. In fact, bureaucratic agencies in Japan and Korea maintain close connections with their social constituents, and depending on issues and macro-political setting, they protect, reward, restrain, and sometimes punish interest groups in their jurisdiction. But the ways bureaucratic agencies in Japan and South Korea interact with their constituents appear to be quite divergent.

Bureaucrats in Japan maintain close ties with their social constituents in terms of administrative guidance and consultation. As the analogy of Japan Inc. implies, business interests associations, if not labor, are very much incorporated within the process of bureaucratic decision making and implementation, and even considered "co-responsible parties in governance and societal guidance."³¹⁾ The effective operation of "advisory commissions (shingikai)" reflects this aspect very well. Collaboration and consent from constituents are essential elements for policy adoption and implementation. They are consulted, and their pressures weigh. When needed, social constituents extend formidable and credible political support to the corresponding bureaucratic agencies. In this sense, the overall links between bureaucrats and their constituents involve organic symbiosis. Apparently, "trust" emanating from long-term interactions, school ties, local connections, and revolving door (amakudari) facilitate the formation of this organic networks between bureaucratic agencies and their constituents.³²⁾

As with Japan, such cultural variables as school and local ties enable bureaucrats in

30) In principle, Party-Government Consultative Meeting (Dangjung Hyupuihoi) is supposed to play such a role in coordinating and resolving inter-agency disputes. In reality, however, it has a very limited influence.

31) Phillip C. Schmitter, "Interest Intermediation and Regime Governability in Contemporary Western Europe and North America," in S. Berger (ed.), *Organizing Interests in Western Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1981), p.295.

32) Okimoto, op. cit.

South Korea to forge and maintain close working relationships with their social constituents. But the pattern of interactions is somewhat different from that in Japan. Social constituents, mostly business interests organizations, are officially recognized as interest intermediaries, but selectively incorporated in bureaucratic decision-making and implementation. Their collaboration is essential for policies to be implemented, but their consent is not necessary for policies to be adopted. They are sporadically consulted, but their pressures do not weigh all the time. Especially, in the case of social constituents who do not share common interests and ideology with their respective agencies such as labor and farmers, inputs from below are not heard and are even systematically repressed.

The bureaucrat-constituent ties change over time and across sectors, but they have basically remained vertical and exclusionary, in which bureaucrats have occupied the strategic position of command and control over the private sector. Functional interdependence exists between the two, but its nature is instrumental rather than consummate. Since the advent of the Sixth Republic, the vertical ties has been very much diluted, but historical inertia is still visible. A recent controversy involving the tax investigation of the Hyundai group reveals this aspect *par excellence*.

In view of the above discussion, state structure in Japan and South Korea is not similar, but divergent in many aspects. South Korea's state structure shows a high degree of executive dominance and centralism, a vertical and sunflower shape of the executive-bureaucratic nexus, dysfunctional bureaucratic dynamics, and mechanistic ties with social constituents. On the other hand, Japanese state structure can be characterized by a moderate executive dominance, a horizontal or parallel executive-bureaucratic nexus, a compartmentalized, but symbiotic bureaucratic dynamics, and organic networks with bureaucratic constituents. Of course, the state structures outlined above are neither fixed nor static. They vary over time and across policy-issue areas. Nevertheless, prototypes presented in Table 1 offer a useful analytical guideline for understanding comparative dimensions of state structure in Japan and South Korea.

IV. Conclusion : Explaining Variations

Contrary to conventional wisdom, state structures in Japan and South Korea are not identical. It is then obvious that divergent state structure leads to divergent policy-making

processes. Horizontal, convoluted, and organic state structure in Japan necessitates incremental, time consuming, and risk-minimizing policy-making processes. By contrast, vertical and mechanical state structure in South Korea tends to allow holistic, scrambling, and risk-taking policy behavior.

What then account for variations between Japan and South Korea? Several factors explain them: First, institutional set-up makes a difference. Japan has adopted a parliamentary system, which naturally weakens the power of the chief executive and ensures the relative autonomy of bureaucracy. Especially, factional politics within the ruling LDP produce multiple poles of power, which in turn prevent bureaucrats from committing themselves to prime minister. Moreover, allocation of minister and political vice minister positions by factional weight allows Japanese bureaucrats to enjoy a relatively high degree of power and autonomy by depoliticizing them.

By contrast, South Korea has followed the presidential system that enhances executive dominance and places bureaucrats under captives of the chief executive, especially in terms of personnel administrative matters. The presidential system is predicated on "winner-take-all" formula, and, therefore, political and administrative system takes the unipolarity shape. Under this circumstance, bureaucrats hardly enjoy autonomy and power vis-a-vis chief executives. It is so more because of preminent position of presidential office, resembling a small cabinet.

Second, regime type matters. South Korea has been governed by hard authoritarian regimes in which the chief executive prevails over bureaucracy, civil, and political society including the ruling party through arbitrary rule. Weakening of political parties and legislative branch have distorted the channels of interest representation, aggregation, and articulation, in which bureaucratic agencies emerge sole channels connecting interest groups and chief executives. This excessive degree of power concentration in the hands of the chief executive under the authoritarian setting has produced a state structure rather unique to South Korea, which can be characterized by the "executive-corporatist" formula.³³⁾

By contrast, although limited, political regime in Japan, be it termed a soft authoritarianism or societal corporatism, has allowed pluralistic political practices, and fundamentally constrained arbitrary behavior of the chief executive. Each component of

33) In this sense, I do not agree with the application of bureaucratic authoritarian model to the South Korean case. For a recent discussion of this topic, see James Cotton, "Understanding the State in South Korea: Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism or State Autonomy Theory?" *Comparative Political Studies* 24: 4 (January 1992), pp.512~531.

the state, political society, and civil society is allowed to enjoy its ontological domain, yet within the framework of broadly defined national goals. Each component competes each other fiercely, but shares a strong unity of purpose and follows the altruistic logic of collective action unique to Japan. Historically nurtured trust strengthens organic bonds among the state and civil society.

Finally, divergent historical formation and cultural traits of public bureaucracy also account for the variation between Japan and South Korea. Since the Meiji Restoration, the Japanese public bureaucracy has enjoyed the privileged and relatively autonomous position in terms of recruitment, promotion, and policy behavior. The South Korean bureaucracy has been highly politicized from its inception, and its recruitment and personnel management has been greatly spoiled by political leadership.

What I have discussed so far is not the final analysis of state structure of Japan and South Korea. This represents only a preliminary research effort. My future research will focus on more detailed empirical dimensions by each segment of state structure, on a holistic comparison of Japan and South Korea, and eventually on impacts of state structure on policy performance. Despite the preliminary nature, the present paper has made several important contributions. First, the paper is one of first research efforts to systematically differentiate state structure of Japan and South Korea. Second, my research has shown the ways of overcoming intellectual dilemmas associated with the reification, mythification, and abstract conceptualization of the state and state structure. It is my belief that crafting one's own theory is better than superficially licking and blindly imitating fancy, but empty, foreign theories. Finally, the way I differentiate state structure of Japan and South Korea will help us understand the convergence and divergence of public policy-making in Japan and South Korea.

〈국문초록〉

國家構造에 대한 再認識 : 韓國과 日本의 비교를 중심으로

趙 文 富

지금까지 놀랄만한 국가의 경제성장을 설명하는 여러 이론들은 대체로 동아시아의 문화와 시장, 그리고 국가, 지정학적 위치와 역사 등을 주요 변수로 하여 진행하였다. 그 중에서 국가주의는 동아시아의 경제를 정치경제적 입장에서 설명한 가장 설득력 있는 이론이었다. 국가주의에 따르면 동아시아 국가들의 경이로운 경제성장은 견고하고 지속적인데서 유연한 경제정책과 함께 국가가 독재적으로 개입하여 획일적이고 완벽한 시장기능을 유지하므로써 시장의 기능을 최소로 왜곡화한 점 때문이라고 보고 있다.

그러나 이러한 국가주의의 주장은 국가의 현상을 설명해 온 주요 이론인 신고전주의의 여러가지 단점을 충분히 보강하였다는 주장과 함께 또 다른 많은 학자들에 의해서 수정을 강력하게 요구받고 있다. 특히 일본과 한국의 예를 들면서 국가주의의 한계를 지적하고 있다.

본 논고는 국가는 정치적 리더쉽과 관료제로 구성되었다고 정의할 한다. 즉 국가구조는 정치적 리더쉽과 공공관료제간의 권력을 배분하고 또한 일련의 상호작용관계로 정의할 할 수 있다. 그러나 이러한 과정도 사회구성원과 동떨어져 생각할 수 없다.

따라서 본 연구에서는 국가의 구조는 정치적 리더쉽(대통령이나 수상), 행정부 수반과 관료와의 관계, 관료제내의 역동적인 현상, 사회구성원이라는 네가지 차원을 가지고 분석틀을 만들었다. 이 분석틀을 가지고 적용한 것이 한국과 일본간의 국가구조의 평가와 정책결정의 양상이다.

많은 사람들이 한국과 일본은 국가구조면에서 보면 구조면이나 형태면에서 많은 유사점을 공유하고 있다고 주장한다. 그러나 이러한 주장에도 불구하고 한·일간에는 근본적으로 다른 국가구조를 가지고 있다. 이와 같이 명백히 다른 국가구조는 자연적으로 색다른 정책결정을 산출하게 된다.

일본의 국가구조는 획적으로 복잡하고 유기적이어서, 점증적이고 많은 시간을 요하면서 위험을 최소화하는 정책결정과정을 필요로 한다.

이와는 대조적으로 한국의 국가구조는 수직적이고 기계적이며, 전체주의적이고 불규칙적이며 위험을 수반하는 정책형태를 수반하고 있다.

따라서 본 논문은 이러한 한·일간의 차이를 규명하는 변수들을 찾아내어 설명하는 것이 주요 목적이다.

한·일간의 이러한 차이점이 어디서 비롯되는가를 밝히기 위하여 본 연구자는 다음과 같은 구

조적 특징을 비교하면서 설명하였다.

첫째, 제도적 장치가 다르다는 점이다. 다시 말해서 일본은 집행부의 권한이 상대적으로 약하고 반면에 관료의 권한은 강한 것을 특징으로 하는 내각책임제를 채택한 반면에 한국은 집행부의 권한이 막강하며 또한 관료들은 집행부인 대통령의 수중에 완전히 있는 대통령제를 채택하기 때문이다.

둘째, 양 국가는 정부형태가 다르다. 한국은 관료체제를 대통령이 완전히 지배하는 강력한 권위주의적인 정부에 의해서 움직이는데 반하여 일본은 제한적이지만 연성의 권위주의와 사회적 조합주의적인 성격이 있기 때문에 다원적인 정치관행을 따르고 극단적으로는 통치자의 독재를 막을 수 있다.

끝으로 두 국가의 관료제가 상이한 역사적, 문화적 속성을 갖고 있다는 점이다. 일본은 명치유신 이후에 관료체제가 특권계급으로 인식되었으며 또한 관료의 모집과 승진, 그리고 정책결정시에도 비교적 정치권으로부터 간섭을 덜 받았다. 그러나 한국은 관료체제의 형성초기부터 정치와 매우 밀접하게 관련을 맺고 있어서 관료의 채용과 인사에 정치지도자에 의해서 좌우되는 엽관제 형태를 띠고 있다.

한·일간의 정부구조의 차이점을 분석한 본 논문은 최종적 분석이 아니라 본인이 연구하는 관료제 연구의 예비적 연구결과에 불과하는 점을 주지하고 싶다.

따라서 앞으로 각 국가의 권력구조에 대한 구체적이고 경험적인 차원에서 통괄적인 비교를 하고, 또한 정책형성에 미치는 권력구조가 어떠한 것인가에 초점을 두고 연구를 하여 이 연구를 마무리 할 것이다.

이러한 차원에서 보았을 때, 본 연구의 연구의의는:

- 1) 한·일간의 관료제에 대한 최초의 체계적인 분석이라는 점을 들 수 있다.
- 2) 국가와 국가구조의 연구에서 제시되는 구체화, 신비화, 추상적인 개념 등과 같은 지적 딜레마를 극복할 수 있는 방안을 제시했다는 점이다.
- 3) 본 연구에서 제시한 한국과 일본의 정부구조를 비교하는 방법은 일본과 한국에서 행해지는 정책결정의 차이점과 유사점을 이해하는 데 도움을 줄 것이라는 점이다.