

Re-evaluation of the 4 · 3 (April 3rd, 1948) Uprising
in Jeju-do with New Perspectives and Materials*
(A critique of the views of Merrill and Cumings)

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Blessed is he who has concern for the weak: Psalm 41
Are you your own brother's keeper?
You shall sow, so you will reap.
We do not kiss the whip that beat us.

Preface

I would like to take this opportunity to pay special tributes to my colleagues (and now friends) at Political Science department of Jeju¹⁾ National University:

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professors Kang Keun-hyong, Chang Won-suk, Kim Jin-ho, Ko Sung-bin, and Kang Kyung-hui who helped make my 18 months stay at JNU (from March, 2003 to August, 2004) personally satisfying and academically productive.

Also professors Ko Chung-suk(now new President of the JNU), Kim Sung-jun, Ko Chang-hoon, Yang Young-chul, Min Kee of the department of Public Administration: professors Kim hyong-soo(now retired), Kim Bu-chan, Song Sok-un, Kwon Young-ho, and Kim Chang-kun of the department of Law: professors Ko Young-chul, Park Kyung-sook, Kim Hui-jung, Kim Kyung-ho of the Department of Journalism and Communication come to my mind for their kind and thoughtful considerations and friendship during my stay at JNU.

All these individuals impressed me with their diligence in teaching, research, and community services. They were not only professionals in their chosen fields, but also a cultured scholars and they all command my respect. The last but not the least, my respect and appreciation go to former President Bu Man-keun of JNU, a scholar and an administrator, who had been willing to help me in all respects, including my well being at the faculty apartment of JNU.

Also, it was my great pleasure to meet Dr. Kang Ch'ang-il, formerly professor of history at Baejae University and the fifth Director of the Jeju 4 · 3 Research Institute and currently a member of National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, professor Yu Ch'ol-in and especially, Ms. Kim Jin-hui of the same Institute who tried her best to help me with my research regarding the 4 · 3 incident. It was my great pleasure, too, to join many 4 · 3 related conferences and tour of massacre sites sponsored by the Institute. I wish the Institute and all who work there every success in the years ahead.

A few words are now in order about the reason why I chose to come to JNU as a "domestic faculty exchange professor". I spent considerable time in Honolulu, Hawaii, spending every two months in summer and another two

1) Cheju or Chejudo in accordance with the McCune Reischauer system of writing is now changed to Jeju or Jejudo.

months in winter for the past 15 years(1991-2005), doing research and spending my vacation with my family there.

In particular, I spent one year as a visiting scholar at the Center for Korean Studies at the University of Hawaii, U.S.A. in the year 2000 and I used this time and other visits to Honolulu to translate two books on Korean immigration to the United States, written by my friend and classmate at the University of Pennsylvania, Wayne Patterson.²⁾

My experiences in Oahu, Hawaii where Honolulu is located, enabled me to learn something about the "paradise" which also is a formidable military fortress in the Pacific, (with the Pacific Fleet Command named CINPAC/Commander-in-Chief, Pacific), once attacked by the Japanese on Pearl Harbor³⁾. You can say that Jeju is a Korean counterpart of Oahu in the sense that it was once fortified by the Japanese as a last stand for the defense of Japan proper toward the end of WWII. After Korea's liberation from Japan, Jeju has become a Korean honeymooners' haven with semi-tropical weather.

There are, however, some notable differences as well as similarities between these two islands in their histories, beauties, and tourism that attracted my curiosity which led to the current study, especially because of the statement that, in the words of John Merrill: "Nowhere did such a violent outpouring of popular opposition to a postwar [U.S.] occupation occur. The occupation allowed a campaign of right-wing terror to develop"⁴⁾(this has a strange ring

2) Wayne Patterson, *The Korean Frontier in America: Immigration to Hawaii, 1896-1910* (Honolulu: Univ. of Hawaii Press, 1988) and Wayne Patterson, *Ilse: The First Generation Korean Immigrants in Hawaii, 1903-1973* (Honolulu: Univ. of Hawaii Press, 2000). These books are translated in Korean by Dae-hwa Chung: 정대화 옮김, *아메리카로 가는 길: 한인 하와이 이민사* (서울: 들녘, 2002) and 정대화 옮김, *하와이 한인 이민1세: 그들 삶의 예환과 승리(1903-1973)*(서울: 들녘, 2003).

3) A history channel in the U.S. around December 7 (anniversary of Japanese attack to Pearl Harbor), 2004 had a special presentation arguing that President Franklin Roosevelt knew about the forthcoming attack, with pros and cons on this view. My effort to buy this clip, failed in spite of my order to the history channel.

with American military occupation of Iraq and civilian casualties there at this writing - some 57 years after Jejudo - another atrocity and carnage at another place, as an outgrowth of "U.S. military occupation". I also recall at this juncture, that someone defined "Terroism as violence of the weak, while war is violence of the strong" - couldn't be more convincing). Now George Bush changed his global "War against Terror"(an unwinnable war in my opinion) to "War against Violent Extremists," echoing Tony Blair of Britain - may be a retreat from the previous stance, nonetheless, interesting to say the least.

I personally found Jejudo more preferable to Honolulu in many respects. In particular, Jejudo has four seasons while Honolulu has only one season (or two at the most, summer and winter - compare this to a woman who changes her dresses four times a year, spring, summer, fall, and winter and one who changes once a year or never at all! While Jujudo is multi-colored, Hawaii is "ever-green.") I also found Jejudo a little larger than the island of Oahu and its population is almost half of that of Oahu which in 2005 is approximately one million inhabitants (Jejudo, having roughly 550,000 people). It is interesting to know that Oahu "each year attracts nearly 5 million tourists - some 80,000 a day" with U.S. mainland visitors accounting for nearly 70 percent of Oahu's overall tourist market, the remaining 30% being foreigners.⁵⁾ Surprisingly,

4) John Merrill, "The Chejudo Rebellion," an M.A. thesis, Harvard University, 1975, in *The Journal of Korean Studies*, University of Washington, Seattle, Wash., Vol. 2, 1980, p. 196. I consider this M.A. thesis, as well as Merrill's Chapter 2 (Chejudo Rebellion and May 10 Elections) of his Ph.D. dissertation a very well researched studies on the subject, even though they both use much the same source materials. Korean nationals have been prohibited by successive military dictatorships (Park Chung-hee, Chun Doo-hwan, and Roh Tae-woo) even to utter such subject as Chejudo Rebellion, not to mention uprising until about late 1990's. (At this writing, Iraqis are resisting U.S. military occupation. We have some similarities between Korea in 1948 and Iraq in 2005 in that U.S. in both cases tried to impose election under military occupation. In Korea, we all know that the establishment of a separate regime in South Korea under the U.S. tutelage, resulted in the fratricidal war. Many fear today that a civil war is in the offing in Iraq. In both cases, we know for a fact that innumerable innocent people have been "murdered" by foreign/military policies of the United States, then and now.

5) *101 Things To Do on Oahu*(오아후 섬에서 즐길 수 있는 101가지 관광체험), November

Jeju-do, a late comer to the tourist industry, also attracts nearly 5 million visitors, 90% of them Korean mainlanders (most of them honeymooners, school kids, and other tourists with less spending than their U.S. counterparts) and only 10% foreigners, overwhelming majority of them mainland Chinese whose visas are waived.⁶⁾ (It is interesting that U.S. government waives visas of only Japanese nationals to Honolulu).

Also, there are much more to see for me in Jeju-do, in addition to fabulous natural beauties including ocean and rivers, many pheasants, horses, cows, deers, and goats that roam the pastures and mountain slopes, all kinds of flowers that decorate the island every different season (One kind of yellow wild flower even blooms bursting thru snow!). And there are the snow-topped majestic Halla Mountain in winter and 366 cones to climb year round! Many kinds of fishes and good Korean cow and hog meats and tangerines abound the island, decorating the island gold in the fall. I must say here that Honolulu also has beauties and merits of its own: pleasant early mornings and evenings, fantastic sunsets and rainbows, and you can swim all year round!

Traditionally, the island has been noted for "Three Plenties (Sam Da)" and "Three-Have-Nots" or "Three Dearth (or Sam Moo)". Three Plenties refer to lots of (1) Winds, (2) Women, and (3) rocks on the island and "Three-Have-Nots" refer to (1) No thieves, (2) No beggars, and (3) No gates. I

2002 - March 2003, Published by 101 Inc., 250 Ward Avenue #231, Honolulu, Hawaii 96814 (also visit www.101things.com). I lectured at JNU, comparing Honolulu and Jeju-do, using the data in the above material, once or twice in the year 2002-2003, however, I was genuinely surprised to find similar publication entitled, *101 체험관광: 제주에 가면 즐겁다: Let's Together Jeju Island! 101* (2004년 6월 제주도 발간) (*101 Tour Experiences: You Are Happy When You Go to Jeju-do!* with an English title, *Let's Together Jeju Island! 101*, put out by the Bureau of Tourism and Culture, Jeju Provincial Government in June 2004.

6) Dae-hwa Chung, "North Jeju County that Will Lead Jeju-do to the World", a paper submitted to the North Jeju County in July 2003 for "Policy Idea Suggestion Contest for Development of Jeju." This author was awarded the Grand Prize with a cash. 정대화, "세계속의 제주도를 견인할 북제주군: 전략적 문제와 전망" 본 저자에 의한 2003년 북제주군 실시 제주발전 아이디어 공모 대상 수상 논문 참조.

would like to add here some more and change the "Three-Have-Nots" to "Seven(7)-Have-Nots (Chil Moo)" adding 4 other characteristics of the island, namely, (4) No railways, (5) No subways, (6) No tunnels, (7) No toll-gates, making the island indeed "a Free International City" as proclaimed by the people and city of Jeju and "International Peace Island," as proclaimed by the people of Jeju and President Roh Moo-hyun of Korea. One advice I want to offer to officials of Jeju city and province that occurred to me recently(August, 2005) is that Honolulu officials made strenuous efforts to protect their environment. On Honolulu television they showed how they eliminated sign posts along the scenic routes on the island and also on building structures along the way and also you cannot find huge electric transmission posts that go over the mountains. I sometimes wondered why there was not a single tree on Tapdong street near the Jeju Harbor and thought these things are the things that Jeju officials must take into consideration to preserve environment and beauty of their "paradise."

Finally, I want to indicate that I chose to take advantage of the competitive research grant provided by the Korean Council for University Education to come to this island. This is then the story of why and how I came to Jeju and retired there, instead of Busan National University, where I spent most of my teaching career. Thus my first motive was my crave to come "home" to this "island paradise"(where I wish to settle eventually if I can) and my interests in the 4·3 incident provided a convenient opportunity to do just that.....

I. INTRODUCTION

I would like to point out at the outset that my subject-title may be an over-statement. It is only partially true in the sense that I made efforts to use new materials with new perspectives. This is then a preliminary review of

the studies of two Americans: Bruce Cumings, a professor of history at the University of Chicago, and John R. Merrill, a professor-turned bureaucrat at the U.S. Department of State in the Bureau of Research and Intelligence regarding the 4·3 (April 3rd, 1948) Incident in Jeju-do, Korea, where more or less 30,000 to 60,000 islanders have been massacred in Cold War in the aftermath of WWII under U.S. military occupation.⁷⁾ This is an effort to have a glimpse of their views on several salient issues of this incident.

My initial interest has been how this tragedy has been interpreted and viewed by American people in general, however, in the absence of such views, I thought it would be interesting to have a look into the perspectives of intellectuals (and scholars in particular) who have written on the subject. (As Merrill quotes David Steinberg "no more than a few paragraphs have been published on it in English"⁸⁾. After some 35 years, writing on it in English is proliferating, even by Korean and foreign researchers, however, it is still very infrequent). This is another reason why I chose to write this piece in English. To name just a few, there is an unpublished paper by Naoko Murakami, entitled, *Subalternity, Historiography, and Power in Contemporary Society: The Case of the Cheju-do Incident*. James West contributed an article entitled "Cheju April 3rd Martial Law: Was it Legal" and Walcott Wheeler, an article entitled, "The 1948 Cheju-do Civil War" in Hur Sang Soo, ed., *For the Truth and Reparations: Cheju April 3rd Massacre Not Forgotten*(Seoul: BaekSan Publisher Co., 2001).

My objective in this study, however, is quite limited to preliminary evaluation firstly of research materials and views of Bruce Cumings and John Merrill regarding the 4·3 Incident, in the absence of materials on this topic by American people in general, in spite of the involvement of their military

7) Ho-Joon Huh, "The Study on the Process of Cheju 4·3 Uprising and the Counter Strategy of USAMGIK," a master's thesis in political science, Jeju Univ., 2002, p. 122, esp. foot note 352 for fuller details. Exact number of killed is difficult to tell.

8) John Merrill, "KOREA: THE PENINSULAR ORIGINS OF THE WAR"(Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1989), p. 197.

and government. Cumings and Merrill are two Americans who devoted much of their time in Korean studies, and fortunately, a part of their researches touch specifically on the Jeju April 3rd incident (or uprising or rebellion) as it is described differently by different authors. (It appears that Cumings is more in favor of the term "uprising" to "rebellion" than Merrill is, however, my unscientific analysis of their usage of these terms revealed that they both use these terms interchangeably with similar frequencies). Writing on this subject is a rather rare endeavor undertaken by American researchers/scholars and I thought it would be interesting to evaluate how these two prominent Americans, one a scholar and the other a bureaucrat, view the 4·3 incident, as I thought not many other American researchers seemed particularly interested in the topic, in spite of similar incidents that have taken place throughout the world (another example is a massacre of 30,000-40,000 Taiwanese by Chiang Kai-shek in the Feb. 28, 1947 incident and the "white terror" in 1950 after U.S. CIA was withdrawn from mainland China to Taiwan, and 160,000 people massacred in Greece and 250,000(1/5 of then population of approximately 1,300,000) Okinawans have been sacrificed as a result of the fierce battle in Okinawa toward the end of WWII.⁹⁾).

I intentionally gave myself a rather simple and limited objective and I intend to look into their publications to see what similarities or differences if any exist between their researches and perspectives. I intend to evaluate, in the case of Merrill, (1) his master's paper entitled "The Chejudo Rebellion", Harvard University, 1975. This is reproduced in the *Journal of Korean Studies* (Seattle, Washington: Univ. of Washington), Vol. 2, 1980; (2) his doctoral dissertation entitled "INTERNAL WARFARE IN KOREA, 1948-1950: THE LOCAL SETTING OF THE KOREAN WAR," University of Delaware, 1982: [This same material is reproduced in Bruce Cumings, ed., *Child of Conflict: the Korean-American Relationship, 1943-1953* (Seattle and London: University

9) Ho-Joon Huh, *op. cit.*, p. 2, foot notes 5-9. On casualties of Okinawa, see Ko Ch'ang-hoon, forthcoming paper on Peace Island.

of Washington Press, 1983)], and (3) KOREA: *THE PENINSULAR ORIGINS OF THE WAR*, University of Delaware Press, 1989. (4) "THE ORIGINS OF THE KOREAN WAR: UNANSWERED QUESTIONS." in Chul Baum Kim and James I. Matray, eds., *Korea and the Cold War: Division, Destruction, and Disarmament* (Claremont, Calif.: Regina Books, 1993) (This also is reproduced in a Korean publication, the title of which I cannot recall at this writing) among other sources and/or writings.

In the case of Cumings, materials include (1) "The Question of American Responsibility for the Suppression of the Cheju Uprising," presented at the 50th Conference of the April 3, 1948 Cheju Rebellion, Tokyo, March 14, 1998, and his writings in his books, (2) *The Origins of the Korean War. Vol. I: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1981), (3) *The Origins of the Korean War. Vol. II: The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990), (4) aforementioned *Child of Conflict*, and other writings and views expressed at the Harvard Conference on 4·3 held at Harvard University, April 24-26, 2003. (I tried in vain through e-mail, however, to contact Cumings regarding these verbatim records). I wish that I do justice to these two individuals about their otherwise excellent researches and their scholarly interests in the topic. I intend to continue to revise and update this paper in the future to the extent possible.

My other interest in broader scope of this study is to look at the wider context of WWII and its aftermath, with my own interpretation that Britain and the United States probably started the Cold War with deadly impact on Korea and the Korean people. The ideological war Churchill/Truman and Stalin was waging in Europe was reproduced in the Far East and in Korea. The case in point is (1) thwarting of Russians in Korea, after none other than Franklin D. Roosevelt induced Stalin to come into the war in the Far East, (2) Scrapping of the "Trusteeship Plan" for Korea, agreed at Moscow Conference of December 1945, which none other than Roosevelt advanced to

Stalin (U.S. Governor General in Korea Lt. Gen. John R. Hodge propagandized this as the idea of Stalin, only to retract it). (3) The first suggestion for the truce of the Korean war was made by the U.S. representative at the United Nations, however, this also was propagandized in Korea as "suggestion by the Communists" to throw more fuel to the unfolding fratricidal drama on the Korean Peninsula. I cannot but believe now that all of these has been a part of calculated U.S. propaganda, psychological warfare, or civil affairs "gimmicks" on the part of the Truman administration.

I want to call attention to readers that we are living in an era today, especially in Korea, where some people demand "dismantling of General Douglas MacArthur's statue" in Incheon commemorating his Incheon landing (see major Korean newspapers, dated August 24-5, 2005), because, this man was after all, the figure who implemented the General Order No. 1 which divided Korea and he, as a Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, proclaimed the U.S. Military Government was the only government in Korea and any indigenous Korean attempts at self-government would be outlawed and followed it with action - implementing his "Non-recognition" policy. He also destroyed innumerable number of Koreans and property in the process of Incheon landing and pushing to the Yalu and "retreating" to where he had started with no visible military-political achievement.

I argue in this connection that major tenets of the U.S. policy toward Korea has not changed since that time(over the past 60 years) since its division of Korea in 1945 and military occupation of Korea in 1948 in the sense that the United States still occupies Korea militarily and Korea remains divided to this day. It is very illuminating to know that Cumings said somewhere(the source of which I cannot recall) that U.S. occupation of Iraq might continue perhaps for the next 50 years! It now appears at this writing that George Bush will have no alternative but to ship out ignominiously long before that, only because he is failing in the illegal war.

I also argue in the same vein that basic patterns of U.S. foreign policy of

"deception and manipulation" also have not changed in 100 years since the American-Spanish War of 1898 in that America has tended to "exaggerate its danger"¹⁰⁾ and freely intervened and invaded other sovereign countries at her own choosing while, in the word of Kennan again, "Our national security was not threatened"(see p. 8, *American Diplomacy*) and there was no clear and present danger in my opinion (this was the case in Korea, Vietnam, and now Iraq just to name a few). These wars and interventions occurred, duping American congress and people (and the United Nations in the case of Iraq) in illegal, undeclared presidential wars, often over-reacting with mis-perceptions or miscalculations. "Perception of threat to ones security" is one of the most enduring theories of conflict in international relations theory, therefore, mis-perception is considered equally important. Blum substantiated that after WWII alone 12 million people have been killed world over in 67 interventions by the United States.¹¹⁾

In this connection, I will use change in international politics in the aftermath of WWII as an independent variable and developments in Jeju as a dependent variable.

For this paper, I utilize both inductive and deductive methods in social science. Firstly, I use inductive/historical approach to analyze post WWII international situation, namely the Cold War, and the 4·3 Incident in Korea (and cursory analysis of events in other areas of the world) and use deductive theory (in a limited way) to analyze that the Anglo-American leaderships used "realism"(or "vulgar" realism) in international relations or "Power Politics"(especially aggressive pursuit of narrowly defined selfish national interests, i.e., "the concept of national interests defined in terms of power" - Hans J. Morgenthau strain) in their neocolonial-imperialistic designs after WWII¹²⁾, as practiced in their "divide and rule" schemes of Germany.

10) George F. Kennan, *American Diplomacy: 1900-1950* Chicago, Ill.: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 3, 8.

11) William Blum, *The Rogue State*, passim.

Korea, China, collaboration in the return of the French in Indo-China, for their hegemony in world politics.

Next, in focusing on Jeju 4·3 incident, I would like to point out and stress some important developments that have taken place in Korea regarding the 4·3 incident in recent years, particularly in the years the forces of anti-communist military dictatorships in South Korea have dissipated and declined and new civilian and more democratic regimes of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Mu-hyun have emerged (1998-2003) respectively. These new developments are:

1. The institution and establishment of the Jeju 4·3 Research Institute (<http://www.jeju43.org>) in May of 1989, a private research institute exclusively devoted to fact-finding and researches on the 4·3 incident, currently headed by Dr. Lee Kyu-bae. This institute sponsors and conducts seminars, symposiums, conferences, on-site tours of massacre places, publishes its own journal, entitled *Researches on Jeju 4·3 (Jeju 4·3 Yongu)*, now renamed as *4·3 and History (4·3 Gwa Yoksa)* since August 25, 2001.

The Institute translates U.S. government publications/documents in particular (e. g., a series of "Collected Materials on 4·3" such as "Reports of U.S. Army Government in Korea" and "U.S. State Department Documents Relating to Jejudo"), creates oral histories of the surviving victims and eye-witnesses of the historical event, and collect and preserve domestic and foreign M.A. and Ph.D. theses and other publications (including Merrill's M.A. and Cumings Tokyo conference article) to name just a few. They are available in the Institute's growing library.

I regret, however, that I may not be able to take full advantage of these growing materials due to my own limitations and inability. I am encouraged,

12) Merrill alludes to this possibility himself when he says, "The Chejudo rebellion...as Communist-led nationalist movements resisted attempts by Western powers to reimpose colonial structures in the aftermath of World War II." Merrill, "THE PENINSULAR ORIGINS...", 1989, p. 82.

however, that my meager effort in this paper will open doors to other interested researchers and scholars for more rigorous research for this important topic, as I myself intend to continue to maintain my own interests in studies of 4·3.

2. An enactment of a "Special Law concerning Fact-finding and Restoration of Honor of the Victims of 4·3"

3. Establishment based on this special law of a "Committee for Fact-finding and Restoration of Honor of the Victims of 4·3."

4. Based on 2 year's work of this Committee headed by none other than Prime Minister Ko Kon and based on its report and recommendation on October 15, 2003, the President Roh Moo-hyun of the Republic of Korea came to Jeju himself and officially offered "apologies" to the victims of 4·3 as a head of state for the first time in the Republic's history.¹³⁾

5. Proclamation of Jeju as an International Peace Island by President Roh Moo-hyun of the Republic of Korea on January 27, 2005, with pledges to support programs of promoting and expanding peace.

6. Chinese nationals of the PRC and Taiwan are allowed to visit Jeju free of visas (ironically as Japanese nationals alone are allowed to visit Honolulu free of visas) since 2002 or 2003.

7. The University of George Washington exchanged a memorandum of understanding(MOU) with the Provincial Government of Jeju in 2004 with a view to opening its branch on Jeju which is located within 2 air hours

13) Hangeyere Shinmun, Chosun Ilbo, Dong-A Ilbo, Jemin Ilbo, October 31, 2003.

away from Japan and China.¹⁴⁾ although its materialization is open to question, as the GWU, to my understanding, is calculating its advantages with another option in China.

These are then some of major new developments taking place in this island "paradise" since the tragedy and carnage of some 60 years ago which was under the U.S. Military Occupation.

My other desire in this paper is to stimulate debate and change U.S. foreign policy in general, and the U.S. foreign policy toward the Korean peninsula in particular. This calls for a change in "strategic" thinking. My suggestion is "to reverse the U.S. foreign policy toward the Korean peninsula 180 degrees", and embrace or encourage North Korea [or the Democratic People's Republic of Korea(DPRK)], and establish "normal" relations, and help reunify the peninsula (a debt the U.S. owes to the people of Korea) which in my opinion is in the long-range interests of the United States in the changing international political environment, particularly in North-east Asia where China is looming large in the 21st Century.

II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND (with Brief Summaries)

(Already well established events in Korea are only briefly summarized here)

1. The Soviet-American Confrontation with the Onset of the Cold War: An Independent Variable Directly Responsible for the Fate of Korea and Jeju 4·3

At the outset, I want to point out that depending on where (which continent)

14) See Dae-hwa Chung, "North Jeju County that Will Lead Jeju to the World." *op. cit.*

you are located (and depending on your values too), one tends to have different geo-political, strategic outlook on world affairs. Disagreements are bound to set in. One such example is Halliday's views and/or disagreements (at the least on 6 accounts) on one article Merrill contributed to Cumings's book¹⁵).

In this chapter, I will provide my own interpretation of the origins of the Cold War, the subsequent developments in Korea, the 4 · 3 incident, and the hot war in Korea. I realize that there are various arguments on the origins of the Cold War and this is still a nagging question, for some, including myself. However, I do not have space to review all the pros and cons of the arguments here. I want to provide, therefore, my own hypotheses and interpretations of the Cold War.

Who were responsible for the U.S.-Soviet split and start of the Cold War? My basic premise and assumption on this question is that Britain and America are more responsible for the start of the Cold War than the Soviet Union. I place the responsibility squarely to the door of these two Anglo-American crusaders against Communism, after their victory against the Nazis, with overwhelming sacrifice of the Soviet people. Indeed, if "cost of more than 25 million Soviet soldiers and civilians, was a decisive factor for securing an Allied victory."¹⁶

Let's look at the prelude to the Cold War - dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 and 9, 1945 respectively. While the reasons for the use of the bombs are complex, they center around two

15) Please see articles of Merrill and Jon Halliday, in Bruce Cumings, ed., *Child of Conflict: the Korean-American Relationship, 1943-1953* (Seattle, Washington: Univ. of Washington Press, 1983). For example Halliday views the Korean War in the context of a "class struggle," he argues that "the UN lied in Korea by claiming to have observed election in Korea" with visiting only 2 % of polling stations, argues that "the legitimacy of the Rhee regime was open to serious question", and that if "Acheson speech is to be relied on...it must be weighted both against U.S. deeds in Korea and subsequent acts"....to name just a few.

16) Richard Overy, *Russia's War: A History of the Soviet War Effort, 1941-1945* (Penguin Books: New York, 1997), back cover.

interrelated geopolitical aims of the American ruling elite at the end of the WWII: (1) the desire of the Truman administration to limit the influence of the Soviet Union in East Asia by bringing the war to an end before the Soviet forces advanced far into Manchuria/China toward Japan, and (2) the wish to have a physical demonstration of the unrivaled power of the American military, and its willingness to use this power to advance its interests.

I feel that the Soviets rightfully deserve certain areas of influence and domination for their own security. Many argue that "the Cold War was all about Eastern Europe." If, indeed, Stalin's aim was (as I will discuss subsequently) the control over most of Eastern Europe, one could argue that his aim was reasonable. The Russians, however, felt that they had been refused, rejected and betrayed, especially after the Yalta which recognized among others (1) the dominion of the Soviet Union of Eastern Europe and the Balkans, (2) the Soviet interests in Turkey and Iran, (3) and the predominant position of the Soviet Union in the Far North East Asia.¹⁷⁾ Professor Chung Koo Kang of Dong Gook University, Seoul, cites the following 15 reasons why the Russians could have felt betrayed:

1. *The US supported Argentine fascist government at the UN meeting in April 1945 and raised the issue of Poland.*
2. *The US stopped aids to the Soviets.*
3. *The US insistence on inclusion of anti-Communist nationalists[like in Korea] in East European nations under Soviet sphere of influence.*
4. *The US refusal to honor a provision of the Potsdam Agreement whereby the USSR was to receive 50% of war reparations of US \$2 billion.*
5. *The US refusal to provide assistance to the Soviet's post-war reconstruction.*
6. *Disagreement on the division of Germany and disarmament.*

17) Chung Koo Kang, "The U.S. Korea Policy, Division of Korea and the April 3rd Insurrection," in Sang Soo Hur, ed., *For the Truth and Reparations: Cheju April 3rd Massacre Not Forgotten*(Seoul: BaekSan Publishing Co., 2001)

7. *The US monopoly of atomic bombs.*
8. *Churchill's 1946 'iron curtain' address at Fulton, USA.*
9. *1946 March termination of war reparations to the Soviets.*
10. *1946 June termination of US aids to the USSR.*
11. *The Iran and Turkey crisis in the summer of 1946.*
12. *Truman's statement on March 12, 1947 proclaiming global war against communism and anti-USSR isolation policy.*
13. *America's massive aids to Greece and Turkey starting in March 1947.*
14. *The Marshall Plan for economic recovery of West European nations including West Germany.*
15. *Exclusion of the USSR from the Marshall plan forced Molotov to walk out of the Paris Conference in July 1947 and the Soviets formed counter plans. The US domination policy continued to worsen the US-USSR relations and the NSC-48 of April 1950 put the US on a war footing against the Soviets.¹⁸⁾*

According to some Soviet specialists, "There was no question that [Russia's] main ambitions concerned not international Communist prestige but primarily Eastern Europe. All this was revealed by Stalin himself long before Yalta and early in the war. There was no question that, considering the great Russian contribution in the war and their own geographical situation, the Western Allies had no choice but to agree to some of these Russian demands. The tragedy was that they, and particularly the United States did not face this situation until it was too late."¹⁹⁾ "Red Army sacrifices and the terrible suffering of Russian civilians allowed Stalin to manipulate the Western Allies through a sort of blood guilt because their losses had been minimal in comparison."²⁰⁾

18) Kang, *op. cit.*, pp. 78-9.

19) John Lukacs, *A New History of the Cold War* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1967), pp. 42-3.

20) Antony Beevor, *Stalingrad: The Fateful Siege, 1942-1943* (New York: Penguin Books,

I feel that the Soviet bravery and blood, which Churchill praised so lavishly during the war time, were betrayed by none other than Churchill himself by his "Iron Curtain" address in Fulton, Missouri, U.S.A., the very hometown of U.S. President Harry S. Truman. Had it not been for the blood of the Soviet people, indeed Churchill could not only have lost his pants and skin but also all of England, but now lo and behold, with victory in his hands, he wanted to forestall any Soviet moves against the West at an early time in a preventive strategy. The main themes of his Iron Curtain address was calling for "unity (of the West) with strength" (emphasis added) vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. "The statement was preeminently a plea to speak to Russia from the position of overwhelming strength, and for the United States to create and dominate a grand alliance with England that would force Russia to a "settlement" and "good understanding" - the details of which Churchill left to the imagination."²¹⁾

Thus "[in] the world of the Soviet bloc, where the Cold War is officially regarded as a unilateral attack by "capitalism" and "imperialism" upon the "socialist" countries... Some official Soviet versions of the Cold War would set its origins in Churchill's Fulton, Missouri, speech in May 1946."²²⁾

I therefore argue that the main sign posts for the Anglo-American leaders in the immediate post war period to find their way through the landscape of international politics were "power politics of strength" embedded in Churchill's "Iron Curtain" speech of 1946 and the "Containment Policy" espoused by George Kennan's X article in 1947 that found its position as policy subsequently.

These two landmark shifts in U.S. foreign policy or outright hostile policies were immediately translated into not only verve but a series of actions such as the Truman Doctrine of March, 1947, Marshall Plan of June, 1947, declaration

1998), p. 419.

21) Gabriel and Joyce Kolko, *Limits of Power: the World and the United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954* (New York: Harper & Rand, 1972), p. 44.

22) Paul Seabury, *The Rise and Decline of the Cold War* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., p. 6.

of "Containment" as a policy in July, 1947 and initiation of NATO between March 1948 and April 1949 and the Soviets "reacted" to these series of hostile policies with their establishments of Cominform in 1947 (only to abolish it in 1956) and Warsaw Pact in 1955.

According to Western literature, the anvil of cooperation between the two war time "allies" began to erode, with developments in Turkey, Greece, and elsewhere. The United States, in particular, according to this schools of thought, perceived Greece was threatened by a communist insurrection and Turkey was under pressure from Soviet expansion in the Mediterranean and Truman launched the so called Truman doctrine to aid these countries with military and economic aids and protect them from falling under Soviet influence and engaged the Soviet Union in the Cold War.

Cumings states in connection with Greece that American journalist Hugh Dean argued presciently in March 1948 that Korea would soon come to resemble the civil wars in Greece or North China: as in Greece, "North Korea will be accused of sending agitators and military equipment south of the 38th parallel and the Korean problem will be made to look as if it were simply southern defense against northern aggression."²³⁾

Merrill describes this international situation as follow, citing three "recent" Ph.D. dissertations subscribing to the view that the Soviet Union, not the West was more responsible for the origins of the Cold War:

A chill in Soviet-American relations began to set in early in 1947. Faced with massive tasks of reconstruction tasks and blocked by continuing Soviet obstructionism, (emphasis added) American policy shifted from seeking negotiated settlements of postwar issues to creating "situations of strength." Initiatives

23) Hugh Deane Papers, "Notes on Korea," March 20, 1948, as cited in Cumings, "The Question of American Responsibility for the Suppression of the Cheju Uprising," presented at the 50th Anniversary Conference of the April 3, 1948 Cheju Rebellion, Tokyo, March 14, 1998, p. 7.

*poured forth in the spring of 1947: the Truman doctrine in March, the Marshall plan in June, and "containment" in July. Indian summer lingered on for a few months more. As the Soviets searched for appropriate responses, negotiations were reopened on the future of divided countries, including Korea.*²⁴⁾

The Kolkos, however, appears to refute above claims by stating that "The so called Cold War, in brief, was far less the confrontation of the United States with Russia than America's expansion into the entire world - a world the Soviet Union neither controlled nor created."²⁵⁾ The Kolkos also state that "It would be extremely difficult to identify areas in which greater Soviet collaborations would have altered the outcome of America's fundamental programs."²⁶⁾

The Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union was also gradually shifting its ground to East Asia and on the Korean peninsula, and was escalating, especially after the establishment of NATO as a military bloc and enunciation of the "Containment of Communism" on a world-wide scale as a foreign policy of the United States. I am sure the victory of Communism in China in 1949 precipitated the ideological confrontation with Communism with "domino" theory, etc. with traumatic repercussions world wide, and particularly fateful consequences in small strategically located countries like Korea. Different philosophies and world views in the bipolar world and endemic perceptual distortions between the christians and atheism also came to play.

Undoubtedly, each side blamed the other for the causes and onslaught of the Cold War. Under these circumstances, the United States regarded Korea

24) John Merrill, "INTERNAL WARFARE IN KOREA, 1948-1950: THE LOCAL SETTING OF THE KOREAN WAR," an unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Delaware, 1982, pp. 104-5 (esp. his foot notes 1 and 2).

25) The Kolkos, *op. cit.*, p.31.

26) *Ibid.*, p. 714.

as a "bulwark" against Communism for the defense of Japan and a "pawn" to exploit. Any resistance or activities against the U.S. occupation policies in the Far East or in Korea was considered directed from Moscow. Anyone involved in such activities were "almost automatically" branded as Communists. Propaganda, such as, "Better Dead than Red" ensued in the following dramas on the Korean peninsula and the world over.

2. Division of Korea:

It is so far known that allied powers (consisting of U.S., USSR, and the Great Britain) decided to divide Korea at the 38th parallel at a war time conference at Yalta (in 1945). The consideration was that the Russians would accept surrender of Japanese army north of the line and the Americans, the south of the line. This division along with the ensuing Cold War, in my opinion, became the root cause of all evils in Korea (including the 4·3 massacre) and provided the major cause of the Korean war, victimizing Korea as a major battle field in the ideological war between the United States and the Soviet Union. Korea was "liberated" from 36 years of brutal Japanese colonialism only to be "enslaved" in division and war and continued division for the next 60 years (in 2005) - a much longer period than the Japanese occupation and who knows how much longer?

It is instructive to note that Kim Dal Sam, the guerrilla leader on Jeju Hallasan Mountain who called himself "the supreme leader of all rebels in Cheju," stated to Lt. Gen.(then Lt. Col.) Kim Ik Ruhl, the 9th Regimental Commander in Cheju who went to a peace talk with him with full authority granted him by Maj. Gen. William F. Dean, the Military Governor General of the US Military Government in Korea that "pro-Japanese traitor police and those who held high positions under the Japanese became running dogs of the American imperialists after liberation: these traitors tried to cover up their past crimes against the Korean people...that the US police oppression was

several times worse than the Japanese oppression: in particular, the police confiscated properties from innocent people, arrested, tortured and raped the people at will."²⁷⁾ This is an example of long sufferings wrought on the Korean people by America and its foreign policy.

3. Trusteeship Plan for Korea:

At wartime conferences at Cairo and Tehran, the United States decided to administer Korea under the trusteeship plan of the Soviet Union, China, the United States, and the United Kingdom. It is well known that FDR suggested this plan to Stalin and argued that Korea might need 40 years of tutelage considering experiences in the Philippines, however, on the persistence of Stalin, who argued the shorter term the better, the Korean trusteeship period was finally reduced from 10 years to 5 years. As I mentioned previously this FDR's plan was scrapped by Truman and Korean problem was unilaterally taken to the United Nations, in face of opposition by the Soviets that all the avenues of dialogue about the trusteeship had not been exhausted. This is another reason the Truman administration did not live up to the Moscow agreement which was originally put forward by none other than Truman's predecessor, Franklin Roosevelt, and further exacerbated the Cold War on the Korean peninsula.

4. Failure of the U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission on Korea:

Based on the trusteeship plan, the Soviet and American occupying authorities met in Seoul to discuss ways to implement these wartime agreement. However, it soon became clear that Cold War was on irreversibly and these authorities could not agree on fundamentals, such as whom they should consult to

27) Lt. Gen. Kim Ik Ruhl, *The Truth about Cheju 4·3*: Chapter 14: Peace Talks, p. 1.
<http://www.kimsoft.com/1997/43kim14.htm>

implement the agreement. Like in Eastern European countries, America insisted inclusion of anti-communists whereas the Russians insisted their exclusion. In the meantime, when this trusteeship plan was announced almost all Koreans were against the idea at the beginning, however, Koreans in the north of the 38th parallel reversed their original opposition and changed their opposition in support of the trusteeship. South Koreans continued to oppose the idea and ostensibly, this gave the occupation authorities grounds for impasse in their talks. Lt. Gen. John R. Hodge, Governor General of the US Military Government in Korea(USMGIK), stated that the trusteeship plan was a scheme advanced by Stalin, in an effort to ameliorate his hot seat, however, it turned out to his embarrassment that it was the idea of Roosevelt.

5. Transfer of the Korean question to the United Nations:

Finally, the United States, it seemed could not carry out the plan successfully in opposition of the majority of Koreans, and this perhaps provided a convenient opportunity (or in accordance with a pre-conceived plan) for the United States to wash their hands of this problem and transferred the Korean question to the United Nations in opposition of Soviet authorities who argued that Korea was a matter of earlier agreement(i.e., Moscow Conference) and all avenues of dialogue between them had not been exhausted.

6. Failure of U.S. sponsored general election in South Korea alone:

Thus the onset of the Cold War and its intensification seemed to have impacted on the grounds in Korea. The UN resolution, sponsored overwhelmingly by the United States, called for a general election throughout Korea. The Soviet authorities, however, opposed this American sponsored resolution. In the aftermath of impasse, the United States sponsored another resolution, calling

for an election "in such parts of Korea accessible to the United Nations."

This is reminiscent of the recently held election on January 30, 2005 in Iraq staged by American occupying authorities. An election was to be held in Korea on May 10, 1948, under the U.S. military occupation and this was to be a "test case of democracy"(ring the bell?) and It would be the "essential accomplishment" of the U.S. occupation authorities in Korea. Nevertheless, this election was resisted and refused by the people of Jeju alone in the country. This was a single case of failure of election in all of Korea. American plans thus failed ignominiously in Jeju as the first case of resistance against the U.S. occupation policies in Asia according to Merrill. Needless to say repression and massacre followed by South Korean government and its police constabulary and later with army and rightist youth gang in Jeju with U.S. occupation authorities looking away with "benign" neglect. To this story, we shall now turn.

7. The Direct Causes of the 4·3 Uprising

The island of Jeju has a record of harsh rule and exploitation over centuries. It was ruled by the Mongols almost a hundred years, since their joint naval expedition with Koreans to Japan failed due to "kamikaze(devine wind/神風)" in the 13th century. It goes without sayings that the Mongols exploited the islanders with foods and labor.

Successive Korean governments also extracted heavy taxes and also used the inhospitable island as a venue for exiles. Japanese on their part, turned the whole island into a naval fortress, toward the end of WWII, as a last defense against the Japan proper. At one time, there were more Japanese soldiers than the inhabitants. It goes without saying that they too exploited the islanders with provisions and labor. Thus, it is no wonder and it is well known still today that the islanders are quite self-defensive and "exclusive" toward outsiders. The direct causes of 4·3 can be attributed to the following developments:

The first direct violence between the U.S. Military Government in Korea and the people of Jeju-do started on March 1, 1947, in commemorating the 28th anniversary of the Korean independence movement against the Japanese. People of Jeju City, Aewol-myun, and Jochun-myun, some 30,000 strong, participated on the ground of Jeju Buk Elementary school to celebrate the occasion and staged peaceful demonstrations. In the process, a total of 6 residents, ranging from an elementary school student to a housewife have been killed by shooting by the police.²⁸⁾

Merrill, however, introduces a slightly different version citing several sources:

The demonstrations soon turned into a protest against the formation of the South Korean Interim Government, as a huge crowd of over twenty thousand people marched on the square of Cheju city. As the swirling crowd overturned barricades and surged towards the administration building, American troops and Korean troops fired warning shots over the heads of the demonstrators and killed one onlooker. A more serious incident occurred a week later when police killed five persons when they opened fire on a crowd of over a thousand persons attempting to storm a jail where two SKLP [South Korean Labor Party] organizers from the mainland were being held.²⁹⁾

28) Jaemin Ilbosa (Jaeju People's Daily), *4·3 Un Mal Handa (4·3 Speaks)*, Vol. 2, pp. 266-285. "American soldiers on horseback pressed the demonstrators to return home, the demonstrators, in rebuttal, told the American soldiers to go home." 4·3 Yonguso (Research Institute), *Ijaeya Malhem Suda (Now I can Tell)*, Vol. 2 (Seoul: Hanwool, 1989), pp. 72-3, as cited in Ho-Joon Huh, *The Study on the process of Cheju 4·3 Uprising and the Counter Strategy of USAMIK*, an unpublished M.A. thesis, Cheju National University, Dec., 2002, p. 63, footnotes 1 & 2. Ho also cites in the same page. Hq. USAFIK (U.S. Army Forces in Korea), G-2 Weekly Summary No. 79, 16 March 1947; Hq. 6th Inf. Div. G-2 Periodic Report No. 509, 11 March 1947; and Hq. USAFIK G-2 Periodic Report No. 470, 3 March 1947. Ho does not elaborate on contents of these reports.

29) Merrill, *THE PENINSULAR ORIGINS*, 1989, p. 122.

Police, instead of revealing the truth surrounding the incident, started to round up demonstrators, the employees of the Jeju Provincial Government organized their own Committee for Counter-measures for the March 1 Incident on March 10 and entered into a general strike, sending 6 demands to Gen. John R. Hodge, Commanding General, US Forces Korea, and Maj. Thurman A. Stout, Governor General of Jeju. The six demands were: (1) Stop torture and armaments, (2) punish policemen responsible for killing and their commander, (3) Higher police authorities must resign accepting responsibility, (4) Guarantee livelihoods for the dead and wounded, (5) Stop arrest of patriots involved in the demonstration, and (6) Stop inheriting the old atrocities of the Japanese police. 60-75% of the Korean employees of the Military Government in Jeju and 157 other organizations took part in the general strike and paralyzed the island.³⁰⁾

U.S. Military Government in Korea, however, failed to evaluate the true nature of the situation, decriing "the excessively coercive measures"³¹⁾ in the killing as an act of rightful self-defense(emphasis added), regarding Jeju as a "red island"³²⁾ and regarding the general strike as an organized precursor for general strikes forthcoming throughout the country. In the words of Merrill, "Cheju was building toward an explosion."³³⁾ The reckless and immature response of the U.S. Military Government in Korea regarding the island and the people as objects of repression touched off the April 3rd, 1947 rebellion/uprising³⁴⁾ which killed at the least 30,000 people out of the then 300,000 odd people of the island.³⁵⁾

30) Hq. USAFIK, G-2 Weekly Summary No. 79, 16 March 1947; Hq. USAFIK, G-2 Periodic Report No. 512, 14 March 1947; Hq. 6th Inf. Div. G-2 Periodic Report, No 516, 18 March 1947; Jeju Shinbo(Jeju Daily), 12 March 1947; Dokrip Shinbo (Independent Daily), April 5, 1947, as cited in Huh, *op. cit.*, p. 64, foot notes 5-8.

31) Merrill, in *Journal of Korean Studies*, p. 154-5.

32) *Ibid.*, p. 154.

33) *Ibid.*, p. 155.

34) Huh, *Ibid.*, p. 65.

For more detailed causes of the 4·3 event, readers are invited to consult Merrill, Cumings, and other published works in Korean, as they are not the main focus of the current analysis.

III. SOME DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MERRILL AND CUMINGS REGARDING THE 4·3 INCIDENT ON SOME SALIENT ISSUES

1. Semantic differences: "Rebellion" or "Uprising"?

Some may argue that such an exercise is not of great significance, however, we may still distinguish usage of terms "rebellion" and "uprising" by different authors. As history of the island is being re-written in light of new materials, such an exercise may provide a different perspective and historical awareness. According to English-Korean Essence dictionary on the web, the word "rebellion" appears to have connotations of rebel, revolt, resistance, and even conspiracy, and betrayal. On the other hand the word "uprising" seems to have a rather straightforward meaning and connotation of "uprightness(and righteousness?)" more than words, rebellion and revolt.

It appears that the word "rebellion" is a house-hold name for the authorities, establishments, and the people in power, whereas, the word "uprising" is for the oppressed, the grass-roots, and the down-trodden...I had an impression that Merrill preferred to use the term "rebellion" to "uprising" (at the least in the sense that he uses it as the title of his Master's thesis: "The Chejudo Rebellion", Harvard University, 1975), although he used these terms interchangeably on occasion. For example, in his Master's thesis reproduced in the Journal of Korean Studies, 1980, he uses the term "rebellion" 7 times

35) Merrill, 1989, p. 63.

on page 142, 6 times on page 140 (including foot notes), 5 times on page 141. On the contrary, he uses the term "uprising" sporadically, once on page 141 and 3 times on page 142.

One must understand that Merrill wrote his master's paper during the Cold War years in 1975, the same year South Vietnam fell. Few, even in America at that time, would venture out to call "Chejudo rebellion" an "uprising" in the "Red Island"? Nonetheless, a credit is due to him and we students of Korean history must be grateful to him for having ventured out with courage and studied the incident, when no scholars of Korean ancestry in America touched upon the subject.

If word counting has any meaning, it is interesting to note that fewer such words as "rebellion" are found in Merrill's Ph.D. dissertation completed in 1982 entitled INTERNAL WARFARE IN KOREA, 1948-1950: THE LOCAL SETTING OF THE KOREAN WAR (at the university of Delaware) and in his book entitled *Korea: THE PENNINSULAR ORIGINS OF THE WAR* (Newark: Univ. of Delaware Press, published in 1989. Merrill uses the term, "The Chejudo Rebellion" in the titles of both Chapters 2 of the dissertation and the book respectively, however, in sub-titles of the respective chapters (dissertation p. 115 and p. 63 of the book), he uses the term as "The Chejudo Uprising"!

At the end of the chapter 2 of his book(pp. 82-3), he uses the term, rebellion 8 times and the term uprising 5 times. On his Ph.D. dissertation, on chapter 2, page 118, he uses the term, rebellion 4 times and the term uprising 4 times, although most of these terms refer to the "Boxer uprising" of 1900 in China and Chejudo uprising of 1900. Somewhat surprisingly (because I thought his uses of these terms decreased as time went by), I found Merrill still use the word "rebellion" more often than the word "uprising" in one of his latest writings on the subject. For example, he wrote an article entitled, "The American Occupation of Korea," in *Hanguk Hyundaesawa Migunjong*(*The Modern History of Korea and the U.S. Military Government*) published by Hallim

University Press, 1991, and in it he talks about the Jeju rebellion. On pages 53-54, he mentions "rebellion" 7 times while mentioning "uprising" just once.

Cummings also appears to use the terms "rebels," "insurgents," and "guerrillas" interchangeably. In one section of his *Origins of the Korean War*, Vol. II(1990), devoted entirely to "The Cheju Insurgency" on pages 250-259, he uses the term "rebellion or rebels" 17 times and "insurgency or insurgents" 8 times, somewhat to my surprise. He gave me an impression that he preferred the use of the term "uprising" to "rebellion," however, in this case, he used the term "rebel" or "rebellion" more than Merrill.

In one of his latest writings on the subject, "The Question of American Responsibility for the Suppression of the Cheju Uprising"(a total of 12 pages), Cummings uses the terms "insurgency" or "insurgents" 5 times (more than any other terms), the terms "rebel" or "rebellion" 4 times (3 other such terms relating to Yosu rebellion, thus not relating to Cheju rebellion), and the term, "uprising" 3 times.

On the other hand, in his *Origins of the Korean War*, Vol.I(1981), he also devotes a few pages on Cheju incident and here too, Cummings appears to use the term "rebellion(or rebel)" more frequently than the word, "insurgency or insurgent," the ratio of use being 5:2. Cummings also uses the term "guerrilla" innumerable times. It is interesting to note that Prof. Chung Koo Kang uses the term, "insurrection" in his studies we mentioned earlier.

I am somewhat mystified by the "interchangeable" use of these value-laden terms "Rebellion" and "Uprising" by American writers, as they don't seem to be synonyms to me. The word, insurrection/insurgency, may be close to rebellion in meaning. However, in the Korean language, the term "Rebellion"(Pokdong/ 폭동 or 반란) and "Uprising"(uigo/의거 or 봉기) have two distinctly different meanings and connotations, with "Rebellion" having nuance of a very bad derogatory connotation. Thus, we do not say "Kwangju Rebellion." We call it "Kwangju Uprising."

I can only conjecture that when a writer/researcher tries to reflect the

views of one party, e.g., U.S. Military Government or Korean authorities, s/he tends to use the term "rebellion" more often and use the term, "uprising" when s/he tries to represent the other party, i.e., the people in the uprising. Still, if one uses the term "rebellion" more often than "uprising", s/he could be misconstrued as representing more, the views of the "authorities" rather than "the grass-roots" in the struggle. However, I cannot truthfully say that who used the term, rebellion more than other words, as the two writers I examined had different quantity of writings on the subject of 4·3. One thing clear is that Merrill used "Chejudo Rebellion" as his title, whereas Cumings used "Chejudo Uprising" in his title of 4·3 study. On the other hand, it is interesting to note that in his master's thesis written at Jeju University, Ho-Joon Huh simply states as "4·3..." as in his thesis title (제주 4·3의 전개과정과 미군정의 대응전략에 관한 연구), but in contents, he consistently refers to it as "uprising"(봉기) and always referred to the people in the uprising as "armed bands" (무장대), but never as "rebel"(폭도/반도), as opposed to "expedition force"(토벌대) or "Constabulary"(경비대) that suppressed the uprising.³⁶⁾

Another interesting phenomenon is that Lt. Gen. Kim Ik Ruhl, the Commander of the 9th Regiment on Chejudo, the main army garrison, in his posthumous memoirs, states as the title: "The Truth about Cheju 4·3." In the conclusion of his memoirs, Gen. Kim uses the term uprising 5 times and rebellion, 2 times. It is also noteworthy that publishers of Gen. Kim's memoirs, in their half page note, refers to 4·3 as "incident."

On this question, I am grateful to Dr. Glenn D. Paige, President of the Center for Global Nonviolence in Honolulu(I am an associate of this Center), who provided me with a page containing a reference on 4·3 in Russian without a title. According to his translation, this three paragraph reference called it "an armed uprising" and then went on to describe the people in the uprising as "rebels" in the next paragraph and I quote: *The heroic struggle of*

36) Ho-Joon Huh, "The Study on the process of Cheju 4·3 Uprising and the Counter Strategy of USAMGIK." *op. cit.*, English abstract and pp. 117-125.

the workers of Chejudo resonated widely: strikes and mass solidarity meetings took place in many South Korean cities and villages. This produced a serious threat to the American military authorities and to the puppet organs of "self-government." Over the courses of a year punitive actions were taken against the rebels by regular troops with tanks and airplanes. Hundreds of villages were destroyed: thousands of rebels died in battles and were imprisoned.³⁷⁾

I told Professor Paige about my confusion and asked him of his opinion. He seemed to reply that one ought not place much significance on this interchangeable use of the terms rebellion and uprising.

On the other hand, I just want to point out that, as we have seen, it is normal practice by Koreans in general, whether they be scholars or layman, to use the more neutral term "incident" when they refer to the Jeju Uprising, as they call it "Jeju 4·3 Incident." At the least one Japanese named in the introduction, Naoko Murakami, also refers to it as 4·3 incident. (I do not think this is because other descriptions have been suppressed by the authorities. I think that Koreans are probably more sensitive - hence eschew using value-laden terms sub-consciously, as they are hyper-sensitive to the "ideological bombs" these terms carry).

This analysis, if it has any significance, is based on my cursory review of materials of Merrill and Cumings, therefore, if one looks more closely, result could also be different. Therefore, this is merely my impressionistic view of their materials and the readers also should not place much weight on interchangeable uses of these terms.

2. Views on Cold War:

Different views on the origins of the Cold War have unmistakable ideological

37) Editor-in-Chief(no name), *USSR and KOREA* (Eastern Literature Division, Nauka ("Science") Publishing House, Moscow, 1998), pp. 154-55. This material was provided to me by Prof. Paige on August 10, 2005.

nance and are considered to have different interpretations of world politics and different bearings on consequences of the Cold War. In light of the fact that the global Cold War is regarded as terminated in all its practical sense, however, the Cold War is still going on and not yet ended on the Korean peninsula, it may be worthwhile to look at how different authors look at the phenomenon.

On this question, Merrill appears to be on the side of the "West" and put blame on Communists by citing Ruth T. McVey that "The time for compromise was now past. A tightening of control in satellite areas, the establishment of Cominform, and the announcement of the Zhdanov doctrine dividing the world into hostile "socialist and imperialist camps" marked the end of the immediate postwar period of moderation in Soviet foreign policy.³⁸⁾ "The Cold War was on."³⁹⁾

In Korea too, his renderings on "The International Context of the Rebellion..." a reproduction of his Master's paper in the *Journal of Korean Studies*(pp. 155-6, foot note 37) and Ph.D. dissertation, pp. 104-5, foot note 1) are the cases in point, as he states, citing three recent Ph.D. dissertations on U.S foreign policy toward Korea: "A chill in Soviet-American relations began early in 1947. Faced massive tasks of reconstruction and blocked by continuing Soviet obstructionism, American policy shifted from seeking negotiated settlements of postwar issues to creating "situations of strength"(emphasis added). By citing these Ph.D. dissertations, Merrill appears to subscribe to their views.

On the contrary, the Kolkos regarded Communist and Soviet strategy at

38) Ruth T. McVey, "The Southeast Asian Insurrectionary Movements," in *Communism and Revolution*, ed. by Cyril E. Black and Thomas p. Thornton(Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1964), pp. 145-6 as cited in Merrill, *Journal of Korean Studies*, 1980, pp. 155-6(foot note 38) and also Merrill, "INTERNAL WARFARE..."(Ph.D. dissertation), 1982, pp. 104-5, foot note 2.

39) Merrill, *Ibid.*

this time "docile" and "extremely defensive in their approaches to Europe's destiny" and argued that:

...any Soviet offer to negotiate assumed the nature of a threat rather than an opportunity to Washington after 1946 (emphasis added), for it diminished the artificial, increasingly contrived sense of national crisis which was far more essential to containing Congress and the American people than bolshevism. This heightened consciousness of danger [or "exaggeration of danger" in the word of George Kennan], as Washington's only reliable mechanism for administering foreign policy, alone precluded a detente with Moscow.⁴⁰⁾

Here, we note that the Kolkos contradict McVey's view. This is not very surprising, as most of "American" scholars/researchers still subscribe to the view that the Soviet Union, not the West, represented by the United States and the United Kingdom, is responsible for the Cold War.

On the other hand, Cumings, who was once branded as a "revisionist" in the study of the Korean war, stated as follow on the subject and we might quote his statement in some length:

In this small peninsula, the grand conflict of our epoch - that between two world views and two great powers - was played out with peculiar intensity... This idea that this war had origins long before 1950, or that this same Cold War had been fought in Korea since 1945,(emphasis added) or that the United States was entirely responsible for the existing brand of southern politics, rarely if ever penetrated comment on the war: and it still seems difficult to grasp.

Another concern of the present volume will be the considerable evidence in the Korean case that bears on the origins of the Cold War. A quintessential

40) Gabriel and Joyce Kolko, *Limits of Power: the World and the United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954*(New York: Harper & Rand, 1972), pp. 713, 715.

Cold War relationship marked Soviet-American interactions from day one in Korea, the only country in Asia where the United States confronted Soviet power directly after the end of the world war. A policy of containment was pursued from the beginning, even if it had not yet won sanction in Washington: and at several critical junctures in the first year after liberation, containment thinkers on the scene in Seoul won the endorsement of such figures as John J. McCloy, Averell Harriman, and George Kennan.

As the Cold War deepened, the United States attempted to escape the worst effects of previous actions by again seeking multilateral backing for its Korean policy, this time through the auspices of the United Nations(emphasis added).⁴¹⁾

Cumings argues that the containment policy, the policy to contain the power and influence of the USSR in Asia, was actually pursued in Korea since August 1945 (by the time of Korea's liberation from Japan)⁴²⁾ I think he refers to this "a premature "Cold War""(emphasis added)⁴³⁾ He elaborates greatly on containment, "the turn away from compromise with the Soviets (Truman had not liked the Moscow agreements, and decided to "get tough" with the Russians"⁴⁴⁾ He also states about the rollback, "...now the choices were four: cut bait (*Syngman Rhee and Chiang Kai-shek*), containment, ironclad guarantee(*of security*), and rollback"⁴⁵⁾. Also, in relation of Korea to containment, he states that: "The Korean peninsula, far from being a distant backwater, was instead the center of all this action. Close attention to the Korean case therefore goes beyond Korean-American relations: it tells a tale, if not the tale, of the cold war."⁴⁶⁾(Emphasis added).

41) Cumings, *the Origins of the Korean War*, Vol. I(1981), pp. xxvii, xxix, xxvi.

42) Cumings, *Child of Conflict*, op. cit., p. 32

43) Cumings, *the Origins*, Vol. II, p. 619.

44) Cumings, *the Origins*, Vol. I, 225-227; *Ibid.*, p. 17.

45) Cumings, *Child of Conflict*, p. 26. Italics are mine.

46) Cumings, *The Child of Conflict*, op. cit., p. 5.

On this basis, I can only assume that Cumings, as an unorthodox, is critical of the cold war and the debacle in Korea, and the containment policy in particular.

3. Views on the Korean War

Views of Merrill and Cumings on the Korean war are quite similar in the sense that they attribute a great deal to internal violence and the peninsular origins of the Korean War. They both attribute responsibility of Syngman Rhee in provoking the North with repeated clashes along the 38th parallel in 1949.⁴⁷⁾

Merrill quotes Wilfred Burchett who stated that there was "a kind of war" along the parallel from the autumn of 1949. Burchett's further statement follows:

According to my own still incomplete investigation, the war started in fact in August-September 1949 and not in June 1950. Repeated attacks were made along key sectors of the parallel throughout the summer of 1949, by Rhee's forces, aimed at securing jumping off positions for a full-scale invasion of the North. What happened later was that the North Koreans simply decided that things had gone far enough and that the next assault by Rhee's forces would be repulsed: that - having exhausted all possibilities of peaceful unification - those forces would be chased back and the South liberated.⁴⁸⁾

Merrill states about the statement, "Although not completely correct [and

47) Merrill, "THE ORIGINS OF THE KOREAN WAR: UNANSWERED QUESTIONS." in Chul Baum Kim and James Matray, eds., *Korea and the Cold War: Division, Destruction, and Disarmament* (Claremont, Calif.: Regina Books, 1993), pp. 98-99. (This is reproduced almost in its entirety in English in a Korea publication, the source of which I cannot recall/find now).

48) Wilfred G. Burchett, *The Struggle for Korea's National Rights* (P'yongyang, 1974), 11, as cited in Merrill. *Ibid.*, pp. 98-99.

"Although I do not agree with Burchett completely" - in the Korean publication I mentioned]. Burchett is right in saying the border clashes lent a certain preemptive quality to the North Korean attack and bolstered Kim's effort to obtain Stalin's go-ahead."⁴⁹⁾

Merrill's views on the origins of the Korean war is quite clear as in the title of his book, *Korea: THE PENINSULAR ORIGINS OF THE WAR*. He mainly attributes domestic internal violence in Korea, immediately preceding the war during the summer and winter of 1949, such as guerilla warfares, violences along the 38th parallel, as major cause. He states:

*The North hesitated to commit its regular forces at first, but finally demonstrated its annoyance over the continuing border provocations by attacking ROK positions...in the late summer of 1949....The collapse of the southern guerrillas, the prospect of more U.S. military aid.... and American moves to consolidate its position in Japan must have been perceived by the North as increasing this threat to an unacceptable level...Pyongyang may have reasoned that it was better to launch a preemptive strike...*⁵⁰⁾

He goes on to state that... "by the summer of 1950, an attack across the parallel was the only alternative Pyongyang had left."⁵¹⁾ Merrill buttresses his arguments with plausible evidences, and continues to insist that "[C]onventionally, the war is explained solely in terms of international politics without any reference to its peninsular origins."⁵²⁾

However, arguments can be made, on the contrary in support of the traditional "internationalist" view that the fate of the Korean peninsula has almost always been determined predominantly by external influences and interests, not vice versa, over most of its history: by the Chinese, Mongols,

49) Merrill. "The Origins of the Korean War..."., 99.

50) Merrill, 1989, p. 186.

51) *Ibid.*, p.184.

52) *Ibid.*, p. 189.

Japanese, and Americans. By stressing peninsular origins of the war, Merrill seems to de-emphasize, if not losing sight of this historical fact. He appears to argue that his assertions make exception to the thousand years of Korean history. To be fair, I believe that Cumings also emphasize the internal Korean factors at great length.

My view is that all the domestic factors that Merrill and Cumings enumerate in their writings existed in the summer of 1950. True, momentums had been built up for an implosion. However, my question is who, under the circumstances, provided the "catalytic trigger" or provocation to unleash the war? To answer this question, another simple but interesting theory would be to analyze who benefited the most out of this war (and who dropped more bombs and who killed most people in Korea in world-wide conflicts subsequently?). I will elaborate on this later if space permits, or I will discuss it at another opportunity.

On the question of who started the war in Korea, both Merrill and Cumings appear to lean on official line, i.e., "North attacked the South." Cumings (again as branded a "revisionist" by anti-Communists), appear to have some different views on the question of the origins of the Korean war. His two mosaics (1 and 3) out of three, argue that neither North Korea nor South Korea started an all-out war across the parallel.⁵³⁾ The war started from Ongjin peninsula (he says all agrees on this) and moved toward the West. He does not rule out possibilities of a provocation by Rhee or even a fifth column although he does not specify who. He seems to leave this as a still unanswered question. He stated in his own words that this question, "it will not be answered."⁵⁴⁾

If I read him correctly, there was the possibility of provocation in the Korean war. By whom, he wouldn't say. He did not and still does not want to commit himself because it is "pregnant with ideological dynamite"^{55)!}?

53) Cumings, Vol. II, pp. 584-5, 594.

54) Cumings, *op. cit.*, 619.

Therefore, a honest historian, is left with reading between the lines, as he "spills" plenty of information to that effect(possibility of provocation). His writings and evidences he presents on this question appear to point to the complicity of the United States, which he feels the best to left to sleep as yet.

If we employ inductive operation in historiography and surmise American history of external warfare from the Spanish-American war (for which Kennan belatedly admit that it was America who killed 266 [or 254 according to Chidsey]⁵⁶⁾ of its own seamen in the U.S.S Maine to start the war⁵⁷⁾), Vietnam war(Bay of Tonkin resolution, based on absent North Vietnamese attack, to justify the bombing of Hanoi), the attack on Pearl Harbor(some argue that FDR had prior knowledge of the attack and let it happen to mobilize American people against the Nazis⁵⁸⁾), and with U.S. aggression in Iraq, one can argue that there could have been similar outside provocation based on deception and manipulation in the summer of 1950 in Korea, especially with imminent Chinese communist attack on Taiwan estimated by U.S. CIA to occur on July 15, 1950.⁵⁹⁾ The only task is to substantiate it in the years ahead, with a theory of "diagnosis, prescriptions, and therapy," a la Galtung.⁶⁰⁾

It is illuminating to note that Merrill himself states that "After Vietnam, Watergate, and the Iran-Contra affair, it would be the height of naivete' to accept unquestioningly the American position on the Korean War. Subjecting it to close scrutiny seems only a sensible precaution."⁶¹⁾ We may just add to

55) *Ibid.*

56) Donald Barr Chidsey, *The Spanish-American War: A behind-the-scenes account of the war in Cuba* (NY: Crown Publishers, Inc., 1971), p. 58.

57) George F. Kennan, *American Diplomacy: 1900-1950, op.cit.* p. 9. It is instructive to note that Kennan stated: "...in 1900, we exaggerated the security of our position and had an overweening confidence in our strength.....whereas today we exaggerate our dangers....", p. 3. He wrote this in 1951 and rings a bell in 2005 with the war in Iraq.

58) *History Channel*. U.S.A., December 17, 2004, in "Pearl Harbor and FDR."

59) Cumings, *Child of Conflict, op. cit.*, p. 31; Cumings, *The Origins*, Vol. II.

60) Johan Galtung, *Peace by Peaceful Means*.

Merrill's words, the now-known American conspiracy(or provocations) in the Spanish-American War (as elaborated by Kennan that there is a "pattern" in American foreign policy of "exaggeration of danger" when in fact our security is not threatened), even the Dresden bombing of Feb. 13-14, 1945(CNN, BBC, Feb. 14, 2005) ordered by Winston Churchill, not necessarily to defeat Germans but to muzzle Stalin who asked the Britons to do more in the war effort. The killing of at the least 35,000 Germans(Other number is estimated anywhere from 135,000 or 250,000 as there is no exact number available - the number exceeds that of Hiroshima and Nagasaki⁶²⁾) most of them civilians in a city without industrial targets. The Korean casualty alone, amounting to 5.27 million⁶³⁾ and now with the killings in Iraq aggression, "would they ever trust us again?" as Michael Moore in the title of his book asks!⁶⁴⁾

4. Views on SKLP/SKWP(South Korean Labor Party/South Korean Worker's Party)

Whether or not the Jeju 4 · 3 incident was planned, organized, or executed by SKLP/SKWP Jeju branch alone or whether or not it was directed by the central SKLP leadership has been in question, as such was often alleged stand of the South Korean government. In fact USAGIK and the South Korean authorities alleged that 4 · 3 was instigated by Communists.

61) Merrill, 1989, p. 43.

62) Bill Brust, *Defending Principles: The Political Legacy of Bill Brust*, 1985)

63) Young Whan Kihl, *Politics and Policies in Divided Korea* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), p. 42 puts human loss(dead, wounded, and missing) in Korea to be 5,270,604: Kyong-Dong Kim, "Toward a Sociology of War: The Social Impact of the Korean War," in *Korea and World Affairs*, Vol. 5, No.2 (Summer, 1981), p. 251: Kim Hak-Joon, *Hanguk Junjaeng(The Korean War)*(Seoul: Bakyungsa, 1989),pp. 345-347. Kim puts the figure as 5,200,000.(this is 1 out of 6 Koreans). My estimate is that 1 out of 3 North Koreans and 1 out of 10 South Koreans have been sacrificed.

64) Michael Moor, *Will They Ever Trust Us?*

Merrill is quite clear on this point. He unequivocally states that:

The April 3 attacks, though growing out of the SKLP's campaign against the separate elections in the southern zone, were probably undertaken by the militant local leadership of the Cheju party on its own initiative.⁶⁵⁾ He further elaborates that "Most of the evidence, however, indicates that the April rebellion was not centrally planned, even by the "adventurous" Pak Hon-yong, but that a combination of radical local leadership, on the island pushed the resistance against the May elections there out of control."⁶⁶⁾

"The evidence is overwhelming that the central leadership of the SKLP did not plan to stage a rebellion on Chejudo."⁶⁷⁾ "The North had too much at stake in the upcoming [Pyongyang] conference [of April 22-3, 1948] to plan a rebellion on Chejudo."⁶⁸⁾

Cumings similarly states on SKWP that:

The effective political leadership on Cheju until early 1948 was provided by strong leftwing people's committees that first emerged in August 1945, and later continued under the American Occupation(1945-1948). The Occupation preferred to ignore Cheju rather than to do much about the committees.... The result was an entrenched leftwing, one with no important ties to the North and few to the South Korean Workers Party (SKWP) on mainland.... Interrogators also found evidence that the SKWP had infiltrated "not over six trained agitators and organizers" fro the mainland, and none had come from north Korea.⁶⁹⁾

65) Merrill, 1982, p. 117.

66) Merrill, *The Journal of Korean Studies*, 1980, p. 165.

67) Merrill, 1989, p. 82.

68) Merrill, 1989, p. 70.

69) Cumings, *The Question of American Responsibility, op cit.*, pp. 24.

5. Views on the guerrillas

These people were often regarded as "commies" or mountain bandits, or mountain men. Merrill writes: "Led by Communist guerilla bands rushing down from Halla mountain, the people of the island rose up on April 3, 1948, in opposition to elections scheduled for the southern zone."⁷⁰⁾ Many of them in the leadership were in fact educated Korean residents in Japan who left home during the Japanese occupation of Korea but returned after Korea's liberation from Japan.

Merrill continues: "The 1948 rebellion was directed by a leadership educated in Japan, backed by a highly developed organization, and supported by a population exposed to modern ideas by long residence overseas."⁷¹⁾ "Many of these new leaders [of SKLP] were well-educated 'student-draftees' who had been conscripted for service in the Japanese Army."⁷²⁾

There were many sympathizers to their cause, in one extreme case, there was a "defection of the greater part of a constabulary company, between 40 and 100 soldiers"⁷³⁾ On the other hand, innocent family members were forced and driven to go to the mountains, as they were pressured and persecuted by excessive coercive measures of the police with tortures and questions about the whereabouts of their family members as they had to be accounted for. "Anyone unfortunate enough to be found by the government forces in the interior of the island was considered a rebel and dealt with summarily."⁷⁴⁾ After one task force's operation, [A]lso surrendering were 3,600 guerillas.⁷⁵⁾

70) Merrill, 1980, 140.

71) *Ibid.*, 196.

72) *Ibid.*, 158.

73) *Ibid.*, 168.

74) *Ibid.*, 183.

75) UNGA, 4th Session, June 29, 1949. *Report of the United Nations Commission on Korea, vol .2: annexes, final Report of Subcommittee II(A/AC.26/34)* p. 27, as quoted in Merrill, *ibid.*, p. 190.

At one point, people evacuated from the middle range mountain sides to the shores have been driven to the mountain again by erroneous bombardment of these people by the Americans. "[T]heir only effect was to drive 15,000 persons inland to guerilla base areas to escape the shelling."⁷⁶⁾ It may be safe to say that most of these guerrillas were regarded as communists whole sale by the suppressing authorities. However, Cumings found that "none had come from north Korea"⁷⁷⁾...and American "CIC elements found no evidence of North Korean personnel or equipment."⁷⁸⁾

Cumings writes about guerrillas:

The guerrillas generally were know as the "inmin-gun" or People's Army, estimated to be 3,000 to 4,000 strong. But they were not centrally commanded and operated in mobile units (kidong pudae) eighty or a hundred strong that often had little connection with other rebels. This, of course, was one of the elements that made the movement hard to suppress. CIC elements found no evidence of North Korean personnel or equipment.⁷⁹⁾

A posthumous publication of Lt. General Kim Ik Ruhl who commanded the 9th Regiment on the ground, who worked closely with the U.S. Military Administrator (Chief Civil Affairs Officer) of the island, Col. John S. Mansfield stated his views that:

The rebels were assumed to be Communists, but their slogans were mostly for driving out the American occupiers and destroying their police allies. There

76) *Hanguk Chonjaeng-sa*, p. 445 as quoted in Merrill, *ibid.*, p. 185.

77) Cumings, "The Question of American Responsibility," *op. cit.*, p. 4.

78) RG94, Central Intelligence, entry 427, box no. 18343, 441st CIC detachment, report from Cheju of June 18, 1948, as quoted by Cumings, *ibid.*, p. 4.

79) RG94, Central Intelligence, entry 427, box no. 18343, 441st CIC detachment, report from Cheju of June 18, 1948, cited in Cumings, *Ibid.*, p. 4.

*was none of the typical Communist slogans. I also learned from my scouts that the rebels did not escape to the mountains but they stayed in their villages. They were among the people and it was clear to me that this was a popular uprising.*⁸⁰⁾

After negotiating with the guerrilla chief Kim Dal Sam, Gen. Kim stated that "I had no trouble seeing their points and proposed that we should continue the peace talks seeing that they were not Communists. Kim Dal Sam said that no one wanted to stage the uprising but it was a matter of life or death. He said he would be glad to abandon the uprising now, if his demands were met and the Cheju people were allowed to live in peace and freedom."⁸¹⁾

Gen. Kim added that:

*The Soviet delegation [to the U.S.-Soviet Commission] stated that people from different regions had risen up against the US oppressors and cited the Cheju uprising as an example. The Soviets were using the Cheju rebellion to discredit the United States in the world arena. Washington instructed Gen. Dean [Governor General in Korea] to settle the rebellion at once. Col. Mansfield went on to say that our independence depended on prompt suppression of the Cheju rebellion and that I was the man to pull it off. Col. Mansfield told me that the Cheju rebellion must be painted as a Communist rebellion (emphasis added) in order to counter the Soviet propaganda.*⁸²⁾

Cumings also writes about guerrillas that:

"The so-called 'mountain man' is a farmer by day, rioter by night," the

80) Lt. Gen. Kim Ik-Ruhl. *The Truth about Cheju 4 · 3*. published by Korea Web Weekly. www.kimsoft.com/1997/43kima.htm, Ch. 7, p. 1.

81) Lt. Gen. Kim Ik Ruhl. *op. cit.*, Ch. 14, p. 2.

82) *Ibid.*, Ch. 9, p. 3.

*Cheju Constabulary commander said: "frustrated by not knowing the identity of these elusive men, the police in some cases carried out indiscriminate warfare against entire villages." When the Constabulary refused to adopt the same murderous tactics, the police called them communists.*⁸³⁾

However, an American colonel Rothwell H. Brown reported that "People's Democratic Army...although less than one-tenth had firearms. The remainder carried swords, spears, and farm implements. In other words this was a hastily-assembled peasant army...They were for the main part, ignorant, uneducated farmers and fishermen whose livelihood had been profoundly disturbed by the war and the post-war difficulties." "CIC elements found no evidence of North Korean personnel or equipment."⁸⁴⁾

The difference is that American and South Korean authorities "painted" the guerrillas as Communists on purpose (in Cold War fashion they in fact fabricated many Communists). Merrill and Cumings do not necessarily view them as such.

6. Views on NWY (North-West Youth)

Merrill states about them:

... the Military Government sent additional security forces to reinforce its control of the island. About 400 police were dispatched...More importantly, a large number of extreme right-wing Northwest Youth group members were brought in to help the police...The Northwest Youth Group, too, was composed of strongly anti-Communist refugees from North Korea whose members adopted terroristic methods to fight the SKLP and to avenge themselves for

83) Seoul Times, Aug. 6, Aug. 11, 1948; G-2 Intelligence Summary no. 146, June 25-July 2, 1948, as cited in Cumings, "The Question of...", p. 5.

84) Cumings, *the Origins*, Vol. II, 1990, pp.254-5.

being driven from their homes in the North. the group operated without even the minimal constraints that, in theory at least, limited the police.⁸⁵⁾

Cummings' views on them are quite harsh:

Perhaps the affair that most inflamed the island population was the unleashing of the rightwing terrorist group known as the Northwest youth (Suh Buk Ch'ongnyond-dan, NWY) to control and reorient leftists. In late 1947 the CIC had "warned" the NWY their "widespread campaign of terrorism" on Cheju. Under the American command, these same youths joined the police and Constabulary in the Cheju guerrilla suppression campaigns.⁸⁶⁾

The Northwest Youth was said to have "exercised police power more than the police itself and their cruel behavior has invited the deep resentment of the inhabitants."⁸⁷⁾

Cummings continues: "The Northwest Youth now ran Cheju and continued to behave in a very arbitrary and cruel manner" toward the islanders. according to Americans on the scene: "The fact that the Chief of Police was a member of this organization made matters even worse."⁸⁸⁾

Thus both Merrill and Cummings regard the extreme Northwest youths as terrorists and have no sweet words for them.

A posthumous publication of Lt. General Kim Ik Ruhl who commanded the 9th Regiment on the ground, who worked closely with the U.S. Military

85) Merrill in, *op.cit.*, 1980, 154-5.

86) Bruce Cummings. "The Question of American Responsibility for the Suppression of the Cheju Uprising," presented at the 50th Anniversary Conference of the April 3, 1948 Cheju Rebellion. Tokyo, March 14, 1998, p. 3.

87) G-2 Weekly Summary no. 116, Nov. 23-30, 1947; Seoul Times, June 15 and 18, 1950 as quoted by Cummings, *Ibid.*, p. 3.

88) Cummings, *Ibid.*, p. 6.

Administrator (Chief Civil Affairs Officer) of the island. Col. John S. Mansfield stated his views that:

The rebels were assumed to be Communists, but their slogans were mostly for driving out the American occupiers and destroying their police allies. There was none of the typical Communist slogans. I also learned from my scouts that the rebels did not escape to the mountains but they stayed in their villages. They were among the people and it was clear to me that this was a popular uprising.⁸⁹⁾

After negotiating with the guerrilla chief Kim Dal Sam, Gen. Kim stated that "I had no trouble seeing their points and proposed that we should continue the peace talks seeing that they were not Communists. Kim Dal Sam said that no one wanted to stage the uprising but it was a matter of life or death. He said he would be glad to abandon the uprising now, if his demands were met and the Cheju people were allowed to live in peace and freedom."⁹⁰⁾

Gen. Kim added that:

The Soviet delegation [to the U.S.-Soviet Commission] stated that people from different regions had risen up against the US oppressors and cited the Cheju uprising as an example. The Soviets were using the Cheju rebellion to discredit the United States in the world arena. Washington instructed Gen. Dean [Governor General in Korea] to settle the rebellion at once. Col. Mansfield went on to say that our independence depended on prompt suppression of the Cheju rebellion and that I was the man to pull it off. Col. Mansfield told me that the Cheju rebellion must be painted as a Communist

89) Lt. Gen. Kim Ik-Ruhl, *The Truth about Cheju* 4·3, published by Korea Web Weekly, www.kimsoft.com/1997/43kima.htm, Ch. 7, p. 1.

90) Kim Ik-Ruhl, *op.cit.*, Ch. 14, p. 2.

rebellion (emphasis added) in order to counter the Soviet propaganda.⁹¹⁾

However, an American colonel Rothwell H. Brown reported that "People's Democratic Army....although less than one-tenth had firearms. The remainder carried swords, spears, and farm implements. In other words this was a hastily-assembled peasant army....They were for the main part, ignorant, uneducated farmers and fishermen whose livelihood had been profoundly disturbed by the war and the post-war difficulties." "CIC elements found no evidence of North Korean personnel or equipment."⁹²⁾

The difference is that American and South Korean authorities "painted" the guerrillas as Communists on purpose (in Cold War fashion they in fact fabricated many Communists). Merrill and Cumings do not necessarily view them as such.

7. Views on the responsibility for the 4 · 3 incident

Merrill mixes no words on this question. He states that:

The question of American responsibilities and role in the rebellion also has to be addressed. The outbreak of the rebellion must stand as testimony to the failure of the occupation to develop viable policies and establish a workable democracy in Korea. Nowhere else did such a violent outpouring of popular opposition to a postwar occupation occur (emphasis added).... Americans were present as advisors throughout the pacification campaign and should have attempted to modify the excessive brutality with which the operations were often conducted. The excuse that these excesses were inevitable in any case, and that they should not detract from the main goal of defeating the

91) *Ibid.*, Ch. 9, p. 3.

92) Cumings, *the Origins*, Vol. II, 1990, pp.254-5.

*insurgency is unconvincing.*⁹³⁾(emphasis added).

Bruce Cumings also is quite clear on this question and I may be permitted to quote him at length. He states at his Tokyo conference that "I wish to address a single question in my lecture, which is the legal and moral responsibility of the United States of the widespread massacres and unspring brutality with which the Chejudo rebellion was suppressed."⁹⁴⁾(emphasis added).

Under the relevant international law at the time, from August 15, 1945 to August 15, 1948, the United States Army Military Government (USAMGIK) was the sole legal authority in Korea south of the thirty-eighth parallel. Under secret protocols, the U.S. also had operational control of the South Korean armed forces and national police from August 15, 1948 to June 30, 1949.⁹⁵⁾

The United States and the American people were then, and remain today, responsible for events that occurred during that occupation. It is that responsibility which I wish to demonstrate and assess....There were similar massacres by American and South Korean troops throughout the summer of 1950: one former U.S. Central Intelligence Agency operative witnessed the systemic slaughter of 1800 political prisoners at Suwon, shortly after the war broke out⁹⁶⁾:

I stood by helplessly, witnessing the entire affair. Two big bull-dozers worked constantly. One made the ditch-type grave. Trucks loaded with the condemned arrived. Their hands were already tied behind them. They were hastily pushed into a big line along the edge of the newly opened grave. They were quickly shot in the head and pushed into the grave⁹⁷⁾.

93) Merrill, 1980, p. 196.

94) Cumings, "The Question of American Responsibility," *op. cit.*, p. 1.

95) Cumings refers to his two books, *The Origins of the Korean War*, vol. 1 and 2 for his full treatment of the American occupation and relevant documentation.

96) Cumings, "The Question of American Responsibility," p. 1.

97) Col. Donald Nichols, *How Many Times Can I Die* (Brooksville, Fla: Brownville Printing

If I may just quote another such brutality committed in the name of McCarthy type anti-Communism:"Then an unbelievable thing happened. Capt. Hausman[James] strode over to the dead men and shot corpse with his pistol repeatedly."⁹⁸⁾

This is the same notorious intelligence operative Hausman that Cumings mentions who lived in Korea for three decades and distinguished himself in suppressing of the Yosu rebellion. Cumings continues and I quote again: James Hausman...perhaps the most important American operative in Korea, the liaison and nexus point between the American and Korean militaries and their intelligence outfits....In off-camera remarks...Hausman said that Koreans were "brutal bastards." "worse than the Japanese:" he sought to make their brutality more efficient, by showing them, for example, how to douse corpses of executed people with gasoline, thus to hide the method of execution or blame it on communists.⁹⁹⁾

IV. CONCLUSION

According to Chalmers Johnson (*The Sorrows of Empire*), America maintains 725 military facilities throughout the world (Korean base, being the only one on the vast Asiatic continent - there are some 100 facilities in Korea). Johan Galtung calls it America's "Base Bible." According William Blum(*The Rogue State*), America is responsible for 12 million deaths in 67 interventions world over since the WWII. And in the case of the Korean

/Co., 1981), as cited in Korea Web Weekly, www.kimsoft.com in Cumings, "The Question of...." p. 1.

98) Kim Ik Ruhl, *op. cit.*, Ch. 24, pp. 1-2.

99) Interview with James Television, London, Feb., 1987, as cited in Cumings, "The Question of American Responsibility," p. 8.

peninsula, 5.27 million war casualties (thus separate from the 4·3 massacre.....). An estimated 30,000 to 60,000 out of a population of 2500,000 or 300,000 in Chejudo also massacred¹⁰⁰⁾ with Americans looking away with "benign neglect."

Why so much blood-letting all over the world by America, a Christian state. I cannot understand.....Why making so many enemies? Why brutalize and sacrifice so many small states? Now, we see daily that "the violence is coming home" at last to the United States for the first time in its history....Unfortunate!

More than anything else, the Jeju 4·3 uprising and its merciless suppression can be regarded as a prototype of a "State-sponsored terrorism." It is interesting that Kim Sung Rae, a professor of Sogang University, Seoul, calls it a "Fascist Violence" and a "State-sponsored terrorism based on anti-Communist ideology, and racialization and sexualization of the terrorism."¹⁰¹⁾

At this juncture, I want to repeat the phrases I quoted at the beginning of this paper: "Terrorism is violence of the weak, whereas, war is violence of the strong."¹⁰²⁾

Recently, George Bush retreated from his stance on "War on Terror" which in my opinion is unwinnable and changed his rhetoric from War against "Terror" to "Extreme Violence."

As Gupta¹⁰³⁾ cited, A.J.B. Taylor stated that "In cold war, even scholars

100) Ho-Joon Huh, "The Study on the Process of Cheju 4·3 Uprising"....*op. cit.*, p. 122 foot note 352.

101) Kim Sung Rae, "State Sponsored Terrorism and the April 3rd Cheju Uprising From Women's Perspective," a paper presented at the International Conference: The 50th Anniversary of the Cheju April 3rd insurrection, The Human rights and Peace in East Asia, August 21-24, 1998, Chejudo, Korea in Hur Sang Soo, ed., *For the Truth and Reparations: Cheju April 3rd of 1948 Massacre Not Forgotten* (Seoul: Baeksan Publisher Co., 2001), pp. 83-87.

102) Author unknown.

103) Karunakar Gupta, "How Did the Korean War Begin"? *China Quarterly*, October-December, 1972.

lost objectivity.” This couldn’t be more true in the case of Korea. The West, represented by the United States especially alleged and amplified biases and wrong-doings of the Communist side, especially North Korea, continuously defaming, dehumanizing, and demonizing the country to this day.

However, biases/contradictions may have been mutual. I only want to cite a couple of examples to demonstrate biases and distortions of one of the two major protagonists and their “satellites or clientele states” in the Cold War. (1) One is old South Korean claim by successive anti-Communist dictatorships that North Korea’s Kim Il-sung was a fake, an out-right lie typified by Syngman Rhee regime. (2) Another was South Korean equation of any mention of “confederacy with North Korea” tantamount to communism. (3) American propaganda or lies that the plans for trusteeship and truce in Korea were put forward by the Russians, instead of Americans. (4) The last, but not the least is “The official American position...that the Soviet Union ordered the North Koreans to attack South Korea.”¹⁰⁴⁾

In the same vein, the 4·3 in Jeju Uprising was “colored or painted” by the United States Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) as an event instigated by the Communists from North Korea and/or the Soviet Union, or both. It is significant to note that both Merrill and Cumings in their scholarly analyses, however, refute this “propaganda” as false, as they argue persuasively that the 4·3 had no direct connections with neither. Furthermore, they reveal that it was a spontaneous revolt (a popular revolt in the word of Lt. Gen. Kim) with involvement of Jeju regional chapter of the SKWP/SKLP leadership only, without instructions from its center or headquarters.

The shooting of civilians which touched off the whole affair, the USAMGIK defended as “self-defense,” revealing “typical” perceptual problems when in fact over-reaction or “excessively coercive measures”¹⁰⁵⁾ touched it off. As in

104) Merrill, 1989, p. 19.

105) Merrill, “The Chejudo Rebellion,” in *The Journal of Korean Affairs*, p. 155.

Iraq today (as of Sept., 2005), as the Bush administrations considers the promulgation of Iraqi Constitution a great achievement and success, the USAMGIK in 1948 considered the successful holding of May 10 elections in South Korea a great achievement and success. And again as in Iraq today, the USAMGIK or the Truman administration then considered Korea as "a testing ground of democracy" against the Communists. Same old fanfare then and now. Prof. Paige told me that a word "democracy" is disdained from Chinese authorities in the mainland.

With these remarks, I shall now turn to sketch rough outlines of differences in the views of Merrill and Cumings about the 4·3 Incident, recapturing a few major topics and/or issues:

1. Semantic differences: "Rebellion" or "Uprising"?

In their description of the Jeju 4·3 incident, Merrill appeared to prefer the word "Rebellion" over "Uprising" in light of the fact that he used term as his title, although he used the terms interchangeably at times. Cumings, on the other hand appeared to prefer the word "Uprising" to "Rebellion" because he used the term, "Uprising" in his title. Nevertheless, my preliminary investigation of his writings reveal that he used the term "Rebellion" no less than Merrill. I underscore the fact that this analysis is a result of an impressionistic exercise and therefore, another analyst might have a different opinion with different result. My finding is that they both used these words interchangeably, and therefore, one should not place much significance on use of these terms, even though, Koreans (or Orientals?) appear to prefer more neutral term, such as "incident." I do not know if there is any cultural difference between the East and the West on this matter.

2. On views of the Cold War, Merrill appears to lean more on "official line" or view of the so called "West" in citing quite a few studies with such orientation, whereas, Cumings, as a "revisionist or unorthodox" observer, seems

to be critical of the Cold War, especially with regard to Korea, calling it a "Premature Cold War" that started as early as 1945(Cummings, *The Origins*, Vol.II, p. 619 - previously cited).

3. On the origins of the Korean war, the two men have similar views on the arguments that the war had peninsular origins due largely to internal violence. However, that is about it. They do not agree on the exact nature of the origins of the Korean War. Again Merrill seems to adhere to the anti-Communist traditionalist view that North Korea struck first. I get the impression from the two volume(*The Origins*) work of Cummings that he seems freer of ideological orthodoxy, as he repeatedly leaves room for the possibility of provocation by Rhee or even the United States (he never says so although he "spills" plenty and implies it) with use of the "Fifth Column" in triggering the war.

I would like to deviate a bit here from my focus and recapitulate and emphasize again that in this war, Koreans both in north and south suffered 5.27 million dead, wounded, or missing, with a record number of innocent civilian casualties in the history of human warfare according to Kim Hak-Joon, Young-hwan Khil, or Kim Kyung-dong I already cited(American casualty is now revised from 50,000+ to only 30,000+). I feel that we defended Japan and America and they owe us a debt, not vice versa. If we had debt to America, we repaid it more than double in the Vietnam War and Iraq War, considering our per capita ratio of participation/involvement. I want to advise Messrs. Merrill and Cummings that "division of Korea" is responsible for the internal violence that led to war. Some ignorant South Koreans decry over 50,000 American dead in the Korean War, without knowing how many of their compatriots or Chinese were sacrificed in this futile war that ended in a stalemate.

4. On the South Korean Labor Party(SKLP) or the South Korean Workers Party(SKWP):

Merrill and Cumings seem to agree that the SKLP Cheju chapter acted on its own without central direction or North Korean help as far as the uprising was concerned. Again, interesting difference is that the USAMGIK and the South Korean authorities (military included) "depicted" it as led by or instigated by SKLP Center or Communist North Korea or Soviet Union or both! Merrill and Cumings' scholarly works refute again USAGIK or Korean Government position on SKLP/SKWP role in pulling off the incident.

5. Views on guerrilla:

American authorities again, especially the Military Governor on Cheju Island Col. John Mansfield, "painted" them as communists. Korean police also went so far as to brand Cheju Constabulary forces or anybody "communists" when they refused to adopt indiscriminate warfare against entire villages.

According to Cumings, guerrillas were "a hastily-assembled peasant army... They were for the main part, ignorant, uneducated farmers and fishermen whose livelihood had been profoundly disturbed by the war and the post-war difficulties....not centrally commanded and with no evidence of North Korean personnel or equipment."(Cumings Tokyo Paper, p. 4, previously cited).

Merrill has similar views on them. He states that while the leadership was provided by those well-educated 'student-draftees' who had been conscripted to the Japanese Army, there were other innocent family members forced and driven to go to the mountains, as they were pressured by the coercive measures of tortures and questions about the whereabouts of their family members as they had to be accounted for. "Anyone unfortunate enough to be found by the government forces in the interior of the island was considered a rebel[or a guerrilla] and dealt with summarily."¹⁰⁶⁾

6. On NWY Group: They also agree about the terroristic behaviors of the Northwest Youth Group (and the police) as the major culprit in contributing to the 4·3 incident and the failures of the United States Government in Korea and in Jeju. They both seem to have same conclusions in those regards as elaborated in Part II-6 of this paper.

7. Views on the Responsibility for the 4·3 Incident.

Again they seem to agree on the over-all responsibility of American government or American Military Government in Korea (USAMIK) for the 4·3 incident. I note that Cumings is especially harsh on this question by stating that "For it was on that hauntingly beautiful island that the postwar world first witnessed the American capacity for unrestrained violence against indigenous peoples fighting for self-determination and social justice."¹⁰⁷⁾ I believe Merrill is also no less harsh on this question. An important Jeju newspaper, *The Jemin Ilbo* (or Jeju People's Daily) quotes Cumings and Merrill for their views expressed at Harvard Conference on 4·3, held at Harvard University, April 24-26, 2003. The paper cites Cumings as having said, "America definitely has legal responsibility for the 4·3." It went on to say that Drs. John Merrill and Carter Eckert, Director of the Harvard Center for Korean Studies, also positively agreed to the American responsibility."¹⁰⁸⁾ Lt. Gen. Kim also, in his posthumous memoirs, hold US Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) and its "Schorched Earth Policy" in Jeju responsible for the 4·3 in Jeju. I want to quote Gen. Kim. He stated:

I believe that the Cheju 4·3 was due to gross mismanagement and incompetence of the US military government. The Cheju people and the police were allowed to develop intense hostility to each other. The people were

106) Merrill in the *Journal of Korean Studies*, 1980, p. 183.

107) Cumings, "The Question of American Responsibility", *op. cit.*, p.12.

108) *The Jemin Ilbo*, April 28, 2003, front page.

subjected to unbearable white terror and criminal acts by the police and they were forced to take up arms and stand up against the police in self-defense.

If any one of Cheju police commanders, US military administrator (Col. Mansfield), Police Commissioner Cho Byong Ok and US Military Governor-General Dean had grasped the true nature of the uprising and acted wisely, it could have been resolved in a matter of a few days with hardly any casualty.

...The new generations of Koreans must learn that a handful of evil leaders can kill tens of thousands of people...I wrote this manuscript because I witnessed the Cheju 4·3 and I can honestly record the truth...With heaven as my witness, I state here again that my conscience is crystal clear....¹⁰⁹⁾

This leads to my tentative conclusion that the two men have more agreement in their analysis of the 4.3 incident. However, they seem to have some different views on the origins of the Korean war, the Cold War, and have marginal differences on the use of the terms, "rebellion" and "uprising." They have more agreements on the nature of the guerrillas, the brutality of the police and the Northwest Youth Group, and role of the South Korean Labor Party in Chejudo in those fateful years before the Korean War.

Finally I intend to revise this analysis in the future, especially when I translate this evaluation into Korean. If any unintended injustices are done or mistakes made, I will try to rectify them then. In closing, I bid "Selamat Jalan" (Good bye) here in Jakarta, Indonesia, February 17, 2005, where I finished my first draft to this paper and "Aloha" (Hello, Goodbye, I love you, etc.) here in Honolulu, August 29, 2005 where I finally finished the last paper of my career as a university teacher.

109) Lt. Gen. Kim Ik Ruhl, *op. cit.*, ch. 26, p. 1.

Appendix

DECLARATION OF DESIGNATING JEJUDO AS AN INTERNATIONAL PEACE ISLAND BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA**

The Government of the Republic of Korea designates Jeju as an International Peace Island in accordance with Article 12, Special Law establishing Jeju as an International Free City in order that Jeju may make its contribution to international peace, creatively inheriting Jeju's Three-No-Spirits (No gates, No thieves, No beggars Spirit), uplifting the April 3rd (1948) tragedy into a loftier and higher level with mutual reconciliation, mutual co-existence and life together, continuing the spirits of various summit diplomacies held in the island.

The Government of the Republic of Korea affirms that it will carry out the followings into action in order that Jeju may be able to perform its designated functions and practice required roles as an International Peace Island:

- Proclaim world-over that Jeju is designated as an International Peace Island by the Government of the Republic of Korea and carry out various projects without fail, in order to materialize the ideals of the International Peace Island.
- Through this Declaration of International Peace Island, the Government of the Republic of Korea will help Jeju develop into an International Free City with free international exchanges and cooperations.
- The Government of the Republic of Korea will assist Jeju to attain its programs of promotion and expansion of the peace actively.

On the occasion of declaring Jeju as an International Peace Island, the Government of the Republic of Korea reaffirms its resolve to the world that it will take the lead in the promotion of the peace throughout the world.

Date: January 27, 2005

Signed by: Rho Moo-hyun, President
Republic of Korea

** As this important declaration(this is an unofficial translation by the author) solemnly proclaims, the people of Jeju do have come a long way since April 1994, resisting suppression and oppression by successive South Korean military dictatorships and their American allies during the past 57 years. South Korea is still under American military occupation, however, march for peace, seems to have started at long last under the civilian administrations of Kim Dae-jung and Rho Moo-hyun.

국문 초록

제주 4·3의거의 재조명: 새로운 자료와 시각으로

(두 미국인 Merrill과 Cumings의 4·3에 대한 견해 비판)

집필자 : 정대화

본문에 들어가기 전에 필자는 제주도와 하와이에서 가르치고 연구하고 살아온 사람으로서, 먼저 제주도에 대하여 몇 마디 하고자 한다. 관광산업에서 후발주자인 제주도가 2003년에 입도 관광객이 약 500만에 육박하여 하와이의 호놀룰루의 관광객 약 500만 과 같은 수준에 도달 했다는 것은 제주도로서는 대단한 발전이라고 하겠다. (물론 수입 면에서는 차이가 있고, 제주는 국내관광객이 90%, 호놀룰루는 국내관광객이 70%, 제주도는 수학여행객과 중국여행객의 소비성향이 낮으며, 한국의 본토와 제주도는 가까우나, 미국의 본토와 하와이는 멀다는 점, 오후 섬의 1년 관광수입은 1억 달러라는 등등의 차이에도 불구하고), 한국정부는 중국본토 관광객에게 제주방문 시 비자를 면제하고, 미국정부는 하와이 방문 시 일본인에게만 비자를 면제하는 것은 흥미로운 사실이다.

특히 저자가 2002-2003년에 하와이의 호놀룰루가 있는 <오아후 섬에서 즐길 수 있는 101관광체험> (101 THINGS TO DO ON OAHU)이라는 관광잡지를 보고 좋은 아이디어라고 생각하며 제주대학의 강의에서도 인용을 했는데 2004년에 하와이에서 제주도로 다시 와 보니 제주도청에서 이미 <101체험관광: 제주도에 가면 즐겁다: Let's Together Jeju Island! 101> 라는 책자를 발간하여 제주의 빠른 발전 속도에 대하여 더욱 짜릿한 감명을 받았다(본 논문 주 5 참조). 그리고 필자는 제주의 “三無”에 “四無”를 더하여, (즉, 철도 없고, 지하철 없고, 터널 없고, 톨게이트 없음을 더 하여) 이제는 명실 공히 “七無의 섬”이라고 세계에 자랑하고 싶다. 제주는 이래서 더 자유롭고 (국제 자유도시로서, 세계 평화의 섬으로서) 더 평화로우며, 하와이의 오아후 섬보다는 더 아름답다는 것을 우리 모두는 아무리 강조하여도 모자랄 것이다.

4·3연구의 결론에 이러한 말을 하는 것은 필자가 특별히 오아후 섬 보다는 조금 더 커지만, 인구는 절 반 정도 밖에 안 되며, 4철이 분명하고 도로율도 더 높은 제주도를 더 사랑하기 때문이다. 사철 常夏의 綠色 옷 한가지 만 입고 있는 女人(하와이)이 있다고 상상을 해 보라. 그리고 철마다 화사하게 다양한 아름다운 옷차림으로 단장하는 女人(제주도)이 있다고 상상 해 보자! 어디가, 누가 더 아름다운가? 두 말 할 것 없이 옷 한 벌로는 패션 쇼 에도 나가지를 못할 것이다. 물론 - 사철 수영을 할 수 있고 - 상쾌한 아침과 저녁 - 환상적인 무지개 - 그리고 저녁의 석양이 호놀룰루에는 있다고는 하지만.....

그러나 마지막으로 제주도민에게 꼭 한 가지 충언을 드려야 할 말씀은 최근에 (2005년 8월) 필자가 호놀룰루의 텔레비전에서 본 것인데... 호놀룰루 시에서는 (섬에 시가 하나밖에 없음) 섬을 돌아가거나 관통하는 모든 도로에서 개인의 선전포말이나 간판을 깨끗이 정리해 왔으며, 산을 넘어가는 송전탑 역시 호놀룰루에서는 환경보전과 섬의 아름다움을 훼손 하지 않기 위하여 설치하지 않았다는 것이다. 나는 이것이 제주도민들과 공무원들이 자연보존에 더 심혈을 기울이는 듯 하는 하와이에서 배워야 할 점이라고 생각한다. 그리고 제주항 부근에 있는 탑 동에는 왜 한그루의 나무도 없는지, 왜 제주도에는 후진국인 인도네시아 등에도 있는 대형 쇼핑 센타 하나 없는지? 필자는 도민들에게 묻지 않을 수 없다. 탑 동에 나무 한 그루가 없는 것이 바람 때문이라고 나는 생각하지 않는다. 미국 플로리다 와 하와이에도 태풍이 1년에 몇 번은 오기 때문이다.

이제 본론으로 들어가서 본 논문의 목적은 4·3 사건에 책임이 있는 미국인들이 이 사건을 어떻게 인식하고 있는가 하는 것을 알고자 시작하였다. 따라서 일반인 보다는 미국의 지성인들, 특히 학자나 지식인들이 이 문제를 어떻게 생각하는지를 한번 알아보고 싶었다. 따라서 4·3문제에 관심을 가지고 이 방면에 집필을 하고 연구를 해온 미국인 두 사람, 즉 한사람은 현재 미국 시카고 대학의 역사학 교수인 Bruce Cumings 교수의 저작과 논문 등 4개를 분석 평가하고, 그리고 다른 한 사람은 현재 미국무부 정보조사국에서 근무하고 있는 공무원이며, 한 때는 교수였던 John Merrill 박사로서 그의 논문과 집필 등 4개를 포함하여 총 8개정도의 저서와 논문 등을 검토하는 간단하다면 간단한 임무를 제 자신에게 부여하여 제주대학에 와서 학생들을 가르치면서 4·3을 연구하는 기회를 갖게 되었다.

특히 지적할 것은 한국계 미국시민 학자들이 미국에 많이 살고 있음에도 불구하고, 위에 언급한 두 미국인들이 4·3에 관하여 많은 관심을 가지고 연구를 해 오고 집필을 해 준데 대하여 필자는 이 기회를 통하여 그들에게 고마운 마음을 전하고자 한다.

캘리포니아 대학의 Chalmers Johnson 교수의 *Sorrows of Empire*(제국의 슬픔)에 의하면 미국은 세계 도처에 725개의 군사시설을 갖고 있고 한국에는 약 100개를 가지고 있다고 한다. 한국기지는 광활한 아시아 대륙에 있는 유일한 미국의 기지이다. 이것을 Johan Galtung 교수는 미국의 기지에 대한 성경(Base Bible)이라고 말한다. William Blum의 *The Rogue State*(강패국가)에 의하면 미국은 2차대전 이후 세계도처에서 67번의 개입으로 1,200만의 인명을 살상했다고 한다. 한반도에서는 한국전쟁으로 527만 명의 인적희생(사망, 부상, 실종)이 있었다는 것은 아무리 강조하여도 부족하지 않다 (미군은 한국에서 단 3만 몇 천 명이 사망했으나 5만 몇 천 명이 사망한 것으로 발표되어온 것은 잘못이 아니면 조작으로 이제 서야 정부가 바로 잡았다). 아름다운 섬 제주에서는 인구가 겨우 25만이나 30만 밖에 안 되던 때에 3만에서 6만 명의 제주도민이 미국과 이승만 정권의 반공 히스테리에 의해 희생 되었다고 하는 것 역시 놀라운 일이다. 나는 왜 미국이라는 기독교 국가가 (10계명 중 6번째 계명을 무시하고) 그렇게 사람을 많이 죽여야 하는지 이해 할 수 가 없다.

누구의 말대로 “테러는 약자의 폭력이요” “전쟁은 강자의 폭력”이라고 말하

지 않았던가? 현재 하와이에 있는 “범 세계 비폭력 연구소”에서 연구원으로 일하고 있는 필자는 미국의외교정책의 군사주의(American militarism in foreign policy)를 반대한다. 그리고 필자가 미국의외교정책, 특히 한반도에 대한 외교정책에 비판적인 견해를 가지고 있는 것은 이 외교정책을 180도 변경시키고자 하는 목적이 있기 때문이다. 그것은 간단히 말하여 21세기를 맞이하여 세계전략이 변화되고 있는 가운데 미국이 한반도에서 할 일은 북한을 보통국가나 정상국가(normal state)로 인정해 주고 한 반도의 통일에 도움을 주는 것이 21세기에 진정 중국이 미국에 위협이 된다면, 한반도 통일을 지원하는 전략은 미국의 장기 이익에 부합한다고 믿기 때문이다.

여기에다 한 마디만 더 부언한다면 우리는 인천상륙작전으로 유명한 더글러스 맥아더 장군의 동상을 철거하라는 시대에 살고 있다 (2005년 8월 24-25 한국 언론 보도 참조). 어떤 미국인들은 인천의 가장 높은 곳에 맥아더 장군의 동상이 서 있는데 “한국인들의 많은 사랑을 받고 있다”고 옛날 얘기를 하고 있다. 냉전시대의 미국의 선전과 대민사업, 심리작전, 반공교육 일변도에서 탈피하여 이제 역사가 재해석 되고 있는 것이다. 동상철거를 주장하는 사람들은 맥아더야 말로 연합군 최고 사령관으로서 일반명령 제 1호를 선포하여 미국의 한반도의 분단정책을 실천에 옮긴 사람이며, 함포사격과 용단폭격으로 많은 인명과 재산을 파괴한 장본인이며, 38선을 월경하여 압록강까지 갔다가 통일도 이루지 못하고 다시 현 휴전선 근방으로 후퇴하여 남북한의 인명만 살상하고, 이승만과 장개석과 함께 미국의 반공정책을 충실히 수행한 외엔 한국인에겐 38선을 되돌려 준 것이나 다름이 없는 사람이며, 일제 패망 후 우리민족의 자치권을 부인하고 불인정 하는 미 군정정책을 써 왔다는 것이다. 4·3은 미국과 맥아더의 반공정책의 연장선에서 무고한 제주도민들이 희생된 사건이지만 역시 같은 맥락에서 역사는 오늘날 재해석 되고 있다고 보는 것이다.

이제 4·3에 대한 본 논문의 결론에 대하여 말하면 세계2차대전 이후 미국의 대통령 트루만이 모든 악을 공산주의자들에게 돌렸드시 미군정 당국도 “4·3이 북한이나 소련의 사주를 받아 일어났다”고 선전 했으나, 이것이 거짓으로 판명된 것이 Merrill 박사나 Cumings 교수의 학문적인 연구가 “4·3은 북한이나 소련의 사주를 받음이 없이 - 남로당 중앙의 지시도 받음이 없이 - 제주도내에서 자생적으로 남로당 제주 시 지부의 관여 하에 일어난 사건”으로 결론 내리고

있다는 사실이다.

그리고 미군정은 4·3의 도화선이 되었던 발포사건 역시 구태의연하게 “과잉 진압”이나 “과잉반응”에 의한 것이 아니고 “정당방위”였다고 포장 하였다는 점이다. 이러한 미군의 형태는 어제 오늘의 일이 아니다. 다음으로 미국이 2005년 9월 현재 이라크에서 헌법을 제정하는 것을 마치 그들의 큰 성공이자 성과로 선전 하고 있듯이 1948년 한국에서 5·10선거의 성공적인 수행이 미군정의 큰 성과라고 생각하고 있었다는 것이며, 오늘날 이라크의 “민주주의” 운운 하고 있듯이 구태의연하게 한국에서의 민주주의야 말로 공산주의 방어에 대한 시금석이라고 그 때에도 선전하고 있었다는 사실이다. 오늘날 중국에선 미국의 민주주의에 대한 선전에 대하여 “민주”라는 말만 발설하여도 정부가 경계를 한다고 한다. 국민과 국회를 속이고 UN까지 속이며 주권국가에 불법침략을 감행하는 나라가 “민주주의 국가”라고 한다. 그들은 소위 가진자들의 민주주의 일 뿐 이라고 필자는 생각한다.

본 연구는 어디 까지나 초보적인 예비연구 이지만, 이 연구를 통하여 필자는 두 미국인의 4·3 연구에 대하여 다음과 같이 말 할 수 있다. 이제 Merrill 박사(앞으로 M으로 칭함)와 Cumings (앞으로 C) 교수의 4·3에 대한 견해를 보기로 하자:

1. 4·3이 “반란 혹은 폭동(Rebellion)”이나 “의거(Uprising)”냐 하는데 대한 그들의 견해:

물론 이러한 수사학적 문제는 별로 중요하지 않다고 보는 사람도 있겠지만, 그것이 “폭동에 의한 결과”냐, 자동발생적인 “봉기”나 “의거”에 의한 결과냐 하는 것은, 특히 한국말의ニュ앙스에 있어서는 큰 차이가 있다고 하겠다. 일반적으로 말해서 이점에서, M 박사는 주로 “반란”이나 “폭동”이라는 말을 많이 쓰고 있다는 인상을 준다. 그리고 C 교수는 그 반대라는 인상을 준다. 그것은 M 박사가 주로 그의 논문의 제목에 “반란”이나 “폭동”으로 쓰고 있는 반면에 C 교수는 논문이나 강연의 제목에 “의거”라고 쓰고 있기 때문인지도 모른다. 그러나 앞의 서론 부분에 제시한 그들의 논문이나 다른 글들을 읽어 보면 두 사람 모두 그의 같은 빈도수로 반란/폭동(rebellion) 과 의거(uprising), 반도(insurgent), 게릴라(guerrilla) 등을 쓰고 있으며, 특히 “반란/폭동”과 “의거”를

혼용하여 쓰고 있는 것을 보고 필자는 상당히 의아 하였다. 한때는 동양과 서양의 문화적 차이에서 기인하는 것인가 할 정도로 의아 하였으나 이 미국인들이 당국의 의견이나 자료를 반영하고자 할 때는 주로 반란이나 폭동이라는 말을 많이 쓰고, 제주도민이나 게릴라 혹은 산사람들을 대변할 때는 의거라고 쓰지 않았나 하는 추측을 하게 된다. 흥미로운 것은 본문에서 제시한대로 소련 사람들의 글을 보아도, 적어도 한 논문에 의하면, 1948년 4월에 제주도에서 “인민 봉기 (혹은 의거)가 일어났다”고 말하고 있으면서도 내용에 가서는 “반도/폭도(rebel)라는 말을 불과 반 페이지 분량밖에 되지 않는 4·3부분에 두 번이나 쓰고 있다는 사실이다.

이와는 대조적으로 대부분의 한국인들이나 적어도 한 사람의 일본인 연구자도 4·3을 “4·3사건”이라는 보다 “중립적인 단어”로 쓴다는 경향이 있다는 것을 지적하고 싶다. 중립적인 표현을 하는 것은 냉전시기의 탄압 때문일 수도 있다. 왜냐하면 한국인들은 특히 말 한 마디의 잘못된 사용에 따라서 “좌익” 혹은 “우익”이라는 “이념의 폭탄”이 날아 올 수도 있었기 때문이다. 그러나 본문에 언급한 제주대학에서 석사학위를 받은 허호준은 논문제목에서는 그냥 “4·3”으로만 쓰고 있지만 내용에선 주로 “4·3봉기”라는 말을 쓰고 있고 폭도(rebel)라는 말은 전혀 쓰지 않고 있으며 “무장대” (토벌대나 경비대에 대비하여)라는 말을 주로 쓰고 있음은 특이하다.¹¹⁰⁾ 그리고 무엇보다도 제주 9연대 사령관이었던 김익렬 중장(당시 중령)이 사후에 남긴 유고에 의하면 그 역시 “4·3”으로만 쓰고 있다는 사실이며 유고의 결론을 보면 “의거”라는 말을 5번, 반란이라는 말을 단 2번 쓰고 있다는 것은 단어의 사용에 따라서 사용자들의 가치관을 들여낼 수도 있지 않을까 추리된다.

물론 M 박사는 1970년대에 아직도 냉전의 독기가 왕성할 때 델라웨어 대학의 석사논문으로 4·3을 연구했기 때문에 우리는 그 시대성을 무시 할 수는 없을 것이다. 이 두 분들이 “폭동”과 “의거”라는 말들을 혼용하기도 했지만 필자로서는 이것을 가지고 이것이 그들의 이데올로기 적인 편향을 대표한다고 말하지는 않겠다. 다만 반란이나 의거라는 단어 사용의 빈도수에 있어서는 두 사람이 대동소이 하지만, 내용면에서는 M 박사가 전체적으로 C 교수 보다는

110) 허호준, 제주대학 석사학위논문, “4·3의 전개과정과 미군정의 대응전략에 관한 연구”, 2002, 영문초록 및 pp. 117-125 참조.

다소 보수적이지 않은가 하는 것이 필자의 인상이다. 그러나 필자의 연구는 컴퓨터 같은 것을 동원한 “전체적인” 용어사용의 빈도수나 “과학적” 내용분석을 하지는 않았으며 분석대상 논문들의 용량의 크기에도 차이가 있었으므로 다분히 인상적인 견해라는 것을 밝혀 두며, 적어도 한 관찰자 인 하와이 소재 “범세계 비폭력 연구소”의 소장인 Glenn D. Paige 교수에 의하면 이러한 용어의 사용에 큰 의미를 부여할 필요는 없다는 견해를 피력하였다. 그럼에도 불구하고 이러한 분석은 이제 시작이므로 연구자에 따라서는 다른 결과와 의견이 나올 수 있음을 부언해 둔다.

2. 두 사람의 냉전에 대한 견해:

한국의 분단과 4·3 사건에 직접적인 관련이 있는 냉전이나 냉전의 시작에 대하여 M 박사는 공산측에 책임이 더 있다는 듯한, 소위 서방이나 미 당국의 공식견해에 동조하고 있는 듯한 인상을 준다. 이에 대조적으로 한 때 반공주의 자들이나 반공교수들로부터 “좌익”이라거나 “수정주의자”로 낙인 찍혀온 C 교수는 한국에서의 냉전이 1945년에 이미 시작되었고 이것은 아주 “이른 냉전” 혹은 “시기상조의 냉전”(Premature Cold War in Korea)이라고 말하고 있는 만큼 냉전의 시작에 관해서는 보다 중립적이거나 객관적인 견해를 가지고 있거나 미국에 비판적인 견해를 가지고 있다고 필자는 생각한다. 이 점에 관해서도 보다 더 많은 검토가 필요하겠지만 필자 역시 냉전은 과거의 미국이나 이승만, 기타 우익들의 선전과는 달리 냉전의 시작에 미국이 더 책임이 있다고 보는 견해이다. 이는 본론에서 증거를 제시하며 이미 논하였다.

3. 두 사람의 한국전쟁의 시작이나 그 이데올로기적인 측면에 대한 견해:

이 문제에 대해서는 둘 다 한국전쟁은 북한이 시작한 것으로 우선은 보고 있다. 그러나 큰 차이점은 C 박사는 6·25 당시 인민군이 용진 근처에서 하계 훈련을 하고 있었는데 왜 그들이 갑자기 남쪽으로 방향을 틀어 진격(남침)했느냐 하는 질문을 제시하면서 이승만이나 제 삼자 혹은 5월의 도발이 있지 않았느냐 하는 것을 강하게 암시한다(C 교수의 책 한국전쟁의 기원, 2권 615-9면 참조). 그러나 그는 이러한 질문은 한국에서는 이념적 폭발물(Ideological dynamite)이냐 다름이 없기 때문에 답을 할 수 가없고, 하지 않겠다고 말하고 있다. 그는

단지 인명을 거론하거나 사건의 구체화 없이 “도발”의 가능성만 제시하고 있는데, 필자의 견해로는 미-서 전쟁부터, 월남전, 이라크 전을 수행해온 미국의 일관된 과거 전력으로(기만과 조작의 외교정책) 보아 필자인 나는 C 교수가 미국의 도발 가능성도 배제하지 않고 있다고 본다. 시기적으로 왜 6·25냐 하는 것도 답하지 않고 있지만, 1950년 7월 15일에 모택동의 대만 공격에 대한 미국의 정보가 트루만으로 하여금 모종의 선수를 써서 행동을 하게 하지 않았나 하는 가설이 가능하다. 특히 대만이 일본 방위의 “왼쪽 날개”요 한국이 일본방어의 “오른쪽 날개”라고 보는 견해에 의하면 그러한 가설이 가능하며, 미국은(특히 Acheson은) 왼쪽 날개와 오른쪽 날개, 즉, 대만과 한국을 모두 방어하기를 정책적으로 원했으며 성공하였다. 6월 25일은 한국의 눈에는 물이 대어져 있어 소련 제 탱크가 작전하기에는 불리하였을 것이고 김일성으로서는 추수가 끝난 가을이나 땅이 얼어붙은 겨울이 작전에 더 유리했을 것이나 왜 6월 25일이나 하는 것 역시 C 교수는 답을 하지 않고 있다. 그는 단지 당시 하계훈련을 하던 인민군들이 갑자기 방향을 바꾸어 남진 하였는데, 아마 이승만이나 제 5열의 도발에 의하지 않았을 가하는 의문만 남기고, 확실한 말은 피하며 삼가고 있다.

M 박사와 C 교수 역시 특히 1949년에 이승만이 북한에 대한 도발을 엄청나게 많이 하였음을 증언하고 있으며, M 교수는 따라서 “한국전쟁이 실은 1949년에 시작한 것이나 마찬가지”라는 Burchett의 주장에 완전히 동의하지는 않지만 이승만의 도발이 문제가 된 것에는 동의하고 있는듯 하다. 그리고 그는 수정주의자들(즉, Stone, Gupta, 아마 Cumings도 포함하여?)에게 그들의 다른 초점이나 시각에 대해서는 일말의 긍정성을 부여하면서도 일반적으로는 수정주의자들에게 비판적인 시각을 갖고 있는 것으로 보인다.¹¹¹⁾ 이러한 점들이 흥미로우며 그들의 차이점이라고 하겠다. 한국전쟁의 내인론을 특히 강조하는 M 박사에게 내가 할 말은 분단이 없었다면 내적인 갈등이나 폭력도 없었을 것이고 전쟁도 일어나지 않을 수 있었다는 말을 해주고 싶다.

특히 한국전에 대한 C 교수의 견해는 지금도 대단히 놀라운 측면이 없지 않는 것이 그가 제시한 3가지 모자이크(Mosaic)에서 한국전쟁은 북한이나 남한이 시작한 전면전이 아니며(같은 책, 584, 588면), 전쟁이 옹진반도에서 시작하여

111) Merrill, THE PENINSULAR ORIGINS, 1989, pp. 43-5.

확대 된 것에 대하여서는 남북이 모두 합의한다고 주장하며 특히 그는 이승만이나 제 삼 오열의 도발가능성을 암시하고 있는 점에서 차이점이 있다고 하겠다. 그리고 그는 한국전에 대한 사전 정보가 있었다고 하는 것과 위에 말 한대로 한국전이 전면전으로 시작하지 않았다는 주장은 미국의 조야가 거짓말을 하였다는 말이 된다. 왜냐 하면 미국은 자기들이 몰랐던 놀라운 전쟁(Surprise War), 그리고 그것을 전면전(All-out War)으로 포장해 왔기 때문이다. 자세한 것은 그의 한국전쟁에 대한 방대한 두 책을 숙독할 것을 제안한다. 필자는 많은 한국인들(학자 포함)이 프린스턴 대학이 출판한 그의 한국전쟁에 관한 연구를 숙독하지 않은 것으로 알며 과거의 선전에 몰입되거나 아직도 미국과 이승만의 견해를 그대로 믿고 고장난 유성기(Record player)처럼 되풀이하고 있는 것으로 생각한다.

참고로 약간 본문의 초점에서 벗어나 한국전쟁에 관하여 부연한다면, 남북한에서 527만이 희생(사망, 부상, 실종)된 이 전쟁(본문의 김학준, 김경동, 미국교수 길영환의 저서 참조)에서... 세계전사 상 민간인이 가장 많이 희생된 이 전쟁에서 - 국토는 다시 휴전선에서 양분되고 우리는 무엇을 얻었는가? 미국이 가장 많이 얻었고(대만방어, 일본방어, 한국방어) 우리민족이 가장 큰 수난을 당했다. 이것을 모르는 사람들은 한국전에서 미국인이 5만 이상(실은 3만 이상) 죽었다고 “울부 짓는다.” 자기 형제자매가 얼마나 희생된 것은 말하지 않고... 우리가 미국에 빚이 있다고? “아니올시다” 이다! 우리가 빚이 있다면 명분 없는 월남전과 이라크 전 에서 이미 다 갚고 남았다고 할 수 있다. 우리는 미국보다 인구가 적기 때문에 더 큰 참여를 하였다고 볼 수 있다. 우리가 우리피로 미국과 일본을 공산주의로부터 지켜 주었는데 어찌서 우리가 미국에 빚이 있단 말인가??? 미국이 원조를 했다지만 미국의 원조는 “안보의 베일”에 항상 가려져 있고, 미국은 폭격을 하여 거의 모든 것을 파괴해 버린 후 원조를 주는데 이것을 모르는 노 백성들은 미국을 아직도 “구세주”라고 생각하는 것이다. 이러한 것이 바로 그들 외교정책의 목적이라는 것을 모르고....

4. 4.3 사건과 남로당에 대한 견해:

먼저 C 교수는 남로당, 즉 남조선 노동당을 북한의 원문에 충실하여 영어로도 SKWP(South Korean Worker's Party)로 표기하는 반면 M 박사는 반대로

남쪽의 이승만 정부나 미군이 쓰는 표기대로 (혹은 번역 그대로) 남조선 노동당을 영어로도 SKLP(South Korean Labor Party)로 쓰고 있는데 미세한 차이가 있다. 그러나, 두 연구자 모두 4·3 사건은 북조선 노동당이나 남조선노동당 중앙의 통제나 지시 없이 제주지역 남로당 자체의 힘으로 자생적으로 일어난 봉기임을 함께 동의하고 있는 점이 주목된다. 이러한 학자들의 견해는 미군정 당국의 견해나 선전, 즉, “4·3이 북한 공산당이나 소련의 사주에 의해서 일어났다”¹¹²⁾고 하는 것과는 정 반대된다는 것이 특히 중요하다. 후자(미군정이나 남한당국)의 주장들이 거짓임이 들어나는 대목들이다. 그들이 맞다면 4·3의 후예들은 모두 “빨갱이”가 되는 셈이다.

5. 게릴라(산사람)에 대한 견해:

소위 “산사람”에 대한 견해는 M박사나 C 교수 두 분 모두 동의하는 바로서 죄 없는 농민들, 어부들, 도시 빈민들이 살기 위하여, 폭정이나 서북청년단, 경찰대 혹은 방위대의 잔혹성을 피하여 산으로 간 사람들이 많았다고 보고 있으며 지도력은 일본으로 건너갔다가 해방이 되어 돌아온 많은 지성인들에 의하여 지도되었다고 보고 있다. 북한의 직접적인 지휘나 중앙통제의 증거는 없다고 보고 있는 견해이다. 이 점 역시 미군정 당국이나 이승만 정권, 혹은 그의 경찰이나 군들이 시민들을 “공비”나 “빨갱이”로 몰들인 것은 제주도의 미군정 사령관 John A. Mansfield 대령이 제주주둔 제9연대 사령관 김익렬중장 (당시 중령)에게 “소련공산주의의 선전에 맞서기 위하여 제주폭동은 공산주의 폭동으로 페인트칠을 해야 한다”¹¹³⁾고 자신에게 말했다고 증언한 것과 일치하고 있다. 제주 방위대가 토벌대를 무차별 처단하지 않을 때는 경찰이 방위대 까지도 “빨갱이”라고 매도하였다.(When the Constabulary refused to adopt the same murderous tactics, the police called them communists - Cumings, “The Question of American Responsibility...” 전개논문, p. 5). 이점에서도 미군당국이 토벌대가 전부 공비나 빨갱이라는 견해는 C 교수와 M 박사의 견해와 상치된다. 참고로 김익렬 중장은 4·3자체가 “공산주의니 하는 그 어떤 정치이념과

112) 허호준, 전제서, ii.

113) Lt. Gen. Kim Il-Ruhl. “The Truth about Cheju 4·3” in <http://www.kimsoft.com/1997/43kimp.htm>, ch.9, p.3.

도 상관없이 있는 것 이었다”고 단언하고 있다. (“The uprising had nothing to do with Communism or any other political ideology”¹¹⁴⁾). 이것은 미국이 거짓말을 하고 있었다는 결정적인 증거가 될 수 있다.

6. “테러단체”서북청년단에 대한 견해:

이 문제에 대하여 두 미국 연구자의 견해는 이들에 대한 가차 없는 질책으로 4·3 사건 자체가 상당히 이들 북한에서 피난 온 반공청년들의 테러행위와 잔학성에 기인한다고 합의하고 있다. 어떤 연구자는 당시 남한으로 피신 온 북한사람 중에는 친일파, 심지어 죄수들까지 포함되어 있다고 주장한다.

7. 4·3 사건 책임소재에 대한 견해:

필자가 이미 재민일보 보도(2003.4.28)와, C 교수의 논문제목, 즉 “제주 4·3 봉기 진압에 대한 미국의 책임문제”라는 1998년 3월 14일에 일본 동경에서 발표했던 C 교수의 4·3 50주년 기념강연회 자료를 인용하며 지적 했드시..... 또한 2003. 4. 24-26일 간에 하바드 대학에서 있었던 4·3에 관한 심포지움에서 도 C 교수, M 박사, 그리고 하바드 대학 한국문제연구 소장 카트 엑카트 박사 등 모두가 4·3에 대한 미국의 책임이 분명함을 강조하고 있음을 밝혀 둔다. 위에 언급한 김익렬 중장 역시 초토화 작전을 내 세운 미국의 책임이라고 보고 있다.¹¹⁵⁾

끝으로 위 두 미국인의 4·3에 대한 견해에 대한 필자의 결론은 필자의 인상적 견해임을 밝혀 두며 앞으로 더 많은 연구와 자료가 검토되어야 할 것이라고 부연하는 바이다. 또한 본 영문 논문의 부족한 점이나 미비한 점은 한국어로 번역할 때 보완 할 수 있기를 바란다.

(본 논문은 필자가 2003년 제주대학에서 시작하여, 2005년 2월 17일 인도네시아 자카르타에서 첫 초본을 마치고, 2005년 8월 29일 호놀룰루에서 최종 마무리 하였다. 제주대학교의 총장님과 서문에 영문으로 언급한 여러 교수님들에게 그 동안의 호의에 대하여 심심한 감사를 드리며 이 글을 마친다. 인도네시아 말로 안녕히 계세요 (Selamat Jalan), 하와이 말로 알로하 오에(Aloha oe) (안녕하세요? 안녕히 계세요! 사랑해요!).....)

114) *Ibid.*, ch.4. p.1.

115) *Ibid.* ch. 11. p. 1.